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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to §§ 78A-3102(4), 78 A-4-103(2)(j), UCA (1953).
ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Where subdivision Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions

("CC&R's") contain no authority to regulate colors of residences, and limit the
right to approve or disapprove alterations to structural changes in use, may the
Homeowners Association ("HOA") maintain an action, with lis pendens, for
change of color of a garage door'.' Raised and preserved: Motion for Summary
Judgment 4/1/08, Rec. p. 78; Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment 1/29/09,
Rec.p. 351.
2.

Where a subdivision presents a history of free selection of exterior

colors, may the HO A discriminate against an individual ow nei lor selection of a
garage door color? Raised and preserved: Motion for Summary Judgment 4/1/08,
Rec. p. 78; Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment 1/29/09, Rec. p. 351.
3.

May an action to enforce a non-existent power over realty be sup-

ported by a lis pendens? Raised and preserved: Motion to Strike Lis Pendens 9/
16/08, Rec. p. 309.
4.

Where maintenance of the action drives defendant into bankruptcy,

may the action be dismissed as moot, terminating defendant's right to a determina-
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tion that the action was wrongfully maintained? Raised and Preserved: Response
to Motion to Dismiss 10/7/10, Rec. p. 940.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The decisions of the district court herein were made on motions for summary
judgment. The issues presented, therefore, appear to be ones of law, reviewed de
novo, without deference for the views of the district court. E.g., Geisdorfv.
Doughty, 672 P. 2d 67, 69-70 (Utah 1998); Robinson v. State, 20 P. 3d 396, 398
(Utah 2007).
STATEMENT OF FACTS/STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Appellant was the owner of a residence in Barton Hills Subdivision.

Ruling 10/17/08 at 1 -2. See Record pp. 331-332.
2.

Appellant installed certain modifications to the exterior of the prem-

ises, including re-painting the garage door a shade of brown. Id.
3.

Appellee Home Owner's Association ("HOA") filled an action against

appellant asserting that a number of these modifications violated the Covenants,
Conditions and Restrictions ("CC&R's") for the subdivision. The Complaint was
filed with a lis pendens. Id. Record at pp. 1,47
4.

There was then pending a sale of the residence at a substantial value.

The lis pendens prevented the sale. Id. at 9-12. Record p. 47.

6
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5.

Appellee HOA subsequently reduced its claims against appellant to

one that appellant's garage door as re-painted was "too dark". Declaration of Keith
Jones, 3/21/09. See Addendum Doc 7.
6. Upon appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment, the district court determined that while the CC&R's contained no express power over colors, re-painting
was an "alteration" over which the HOA Design Committee had unlimited discretion to prevent "architectural incompatibility". Ruling 10/17/08. See Record p.331.
7.

Brown is a color which appears on exteriors throughout the subdivi-

sion, and occurs naturally in materials ("wood, brick, stucco") specifically authorized by the CC&R's for exteriors. Roofs in the subdivision were almost uniformly
a darker brown than appellant's garage door. Ruling 7/31/09 at 9-10. Record p.664.
8.

The district court also denied appellee's cross-motion for summary

judgment, reserving the issue whether the implied authority found had been abandoned in light of the facts recited in paragraph 7. Ruling 10/17/08. Record p.331.
9.

Prevention of the pending sale drove appellant into bankruptcy. No-

tice of Bankruptcy Filing 7/13/09. Record at p. 659.
10.

Appellee then moved to dismiss its own Complaint and any counter-

claims thereto, each party to bear its own costs and fees. Motion to Dismiss and
for Summary Judgment 9/15/10. Record at pp. 829, 832.
11. The district court granted the latter motion. Order 12/22/10. Record p.
968.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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12.

This appeal was timely filed upon entry of the latter order. Notice of

Appeal 1/11/11. See Record at p. 971.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The district court improperly implied in CC&R's which don't expressly so
provide, an unqualified power to restrict the use on a garage door of a shade of
color common throughout a subdivision, upon the ground that, in the view of the
HOA's "Design Committee" the shade was "too dark." The implication violates
Utah law regarding implication of restrictive covenants, limitation of express terms
to their context and particular language, and reasonable application of restrictive
authority. The district court then, at the request of appellee, dismissed the Complaint and counterclaims as moot, because imposition of the improper restriction
drove appellant into bankruptcy and loss of the property.
This court should reverse, finding no authority to so restrict use of appellant's property, and remand to the district court for assessment of fees and costs
against appellee, and pursuit of an action for wrongful use of civil proceedings at
the option of appellant.
ARGUMENT
THE POWER IMPLIED DID NOT EXIST.
The CC&R's for Barton Woods were first adopted in 1993. See Addendum ..
"5". They were amended in 1997. See Addendum "6". As first adopted, and
thereafter, they provided (Section 3.2):
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
8
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3.2 Description of Lots: The Project consists of individual lots, each of which may or may not be improved and
may or may not include improvements authorized on the
may and/or by the City of Bountiful, Utah. The improvements on some or all of the lots may consist of single family
or one-half (1/2) of a duplex building with the other one-half
(1/2) of the structure being on an adjoining lot. The exterior
of all buildings will be constructed of brick on the lower
part, with the upper part being wood, stucco and/or such
other materials authorized by the committee. All improvements shall be constructed in a style and of materials architecturally compatible with the other improvements on the
Project.
Respecting "architectural control," the 1993 version provided (Section 4.3):
4.3 Architectural Control: The Association, by and
through the Committee, shall be charged and empowered
with control of all construction, improvements, and landscaping on the Project to ensure consistency and compatibility of all improvements and landscaping on the Project.
Respecting "alterations," the 1993 and 1998 versions provide:
5.3 Alterations, Additions and Attachments: No building, fence, wall, tennis court, hot tub or similar structure,
swimming pool or other structure, satellite dish or receiver,
or outside antenna shall be commenced, erected, altered,
placed or permitted to exist on any portion of the Project,
without the prior written approval of the Management
Committee. All buildings, alterations, improvements, additions and maintenance on the Subject Property shall be made
in a workmanlike manner and shall be architecturally compatible with the rest of the Project.
In 1998, Section 4.3 was deleted and replaced with the following:
4.3 Design Review Committee: The purposes of the
Design Review Committee (the "Committee") shall be to
create, maintain and improve Barton Woods Planned Unit
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Development as a pleasant and desirable environment, to establish and preserve a harmonious design for the community
and to protect and promote the value of the Property, exterior design, landscaping and changes or alterations to the existing use of the Property.
There was then added a Paragraph 4.5, as follows:
4.5 Powers of Design Review Committee: The Committee is hereby authorized to perform the design review
functions prescribed in this Declaration and the Association's Bylaws and to carry out the provisions set forth
therein.
The Committee may reject any home and landscape plans it deems do not comply with the provisions of
this Declaration. The decision of the Committee may be reviewed by the Board on appeal by the owner or at the
Board's own discretion. No construction may begin on any
Lot until the Committee has approved the home and landscape plans.
There do not appear to be other directly relevant provisions.
While the CC&R's speak of "materials" and "architectural" "style", except
insofar as they authorize materials ("brick — wood, stucco"), they do not prescribe colors which may be used, nor do they designate lighter or darker shades of
acceptable colors. Nothing in the present action questions the materials used by
defendant, or the architectural style of the subject premises. Plaintiff asserted that,
as re-painted, defendant's garage door was "too dark." Early claims about other
features of the residence (rock trim, etc.) were abandoned.
It appears, therefore, that any authority to regulate must derive from Section
5.3, and any requirement therein that "alterations" be "architecturally compatible."
10
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Appellee asserted that the "purpose" of the Design Review Committee was "to establish and preserve a harmonious design for the community" (f4.5), and allowed
it to "reject any home — plans it deem[ed] not to comply with the provisions of
this Declaration." Thus, says appellee, it could reject any shade of paint color it
regarded as "too dark."
There are two fundamental difficulties with this position, approved by the district court. First, Section 5.3 appears to deal with alterations which may affect use
or function. So long as a structure is not changed in use from "single family residential living purposes," or common adjuncts to such use ("fence, wall, tennis
court, hot tub — swimming pool," etc.), it is questionable whether the section applies or authorizes review by the Committee. It seems questionable, for example,
whether tinting windows, changing from wood to asphalt shingles, or elimination
of a pond from the landscaping, would activate this provision. See, e.g., Freeman
v. Gee, 423 P. 2d 155,159 (Utah 1967); Parrish v. Richards, 336 P. 2d 122, 123
(Utah 1959).
Further, the standard is "architectural compatibility." The complaint here is
that the color chosen by appellant for her garage door was "too dark." It is not
claimed, for example, that such color, a shade of brown, does not naturally occur
among the commonplace colors of materials specifically approved for the exterior
of buildings in this subdivision: brick, wood, stucco. It is not claimed that brown
of varying shades is not used as an exterior color throughout the subdivision.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Roofs in the subdivision are commonly a darker shade of brown. The Complaint is
that the shade chosen by appellant on her garage door is deemed "too dark" by the
Committee.
Were this a case of prescription of a range of permissible colors ("earth tones,"
Fink v. Miller, 896 P. 2d 649, 655 (U. Apps. 19995)) and a choice of a hue outside
that range (fuchsia, orange, chartreuse), the argument might be better. A bright,
unnatural hue might be regarded as "incompatible" with a muted, naturallyoccurring range of color. That, however, is not this case. It would seem to be impossible to show that one shade of brown is architecturally incompatible with other
shades of brown. Indeed, the ordinary concepts of hue and shade in color would
appear to dictate that while hues (red, blue, yellow) may be incompatible, shades
of the same color cannot be.
The Utah rules regarding enforceability of restrictive covenants is welldeveloped:
Where expressly stated, restrictive covenants are
not favored in the law and are strictly construed in
favor of the free and unrestricted use of property.
Robbins v. Finlav. 645 P.2d 623. 627 (Utah 1982):
Parrish v. Richards. 8 Utah 2d 419. 421. 336 P.2d
122. 123 0959): Freeman v. Gee. 18 Utah 2d 339.
345. 423 P.2d 155. 159 (1967\ Generally, express
restrictive covenants are upheld only "where they
are necessary for the protection of the business for
the benefit of which the covenant was made and no
greater restraint is imposed than is reasonably necessary to secure such protection." Allen v. Rose
Park Pharmacy. 120 Utah 608. 614. 237 P.2d 823.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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826 (1951). Under certain extreme circumstances,
a restrictive covenant may arise by implication
from the language of a deed or lease or from the
conduct of the parties. 20 Am.Jur.2d Covenants,
Conditions, and Restrictions § 173 (1965). As a
general rule, however, implied covenants are not
favored in the law. Id. at § 12; Brown v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 94 Wash.2d 359, 617 P.2d 704 (1980),
In order for a restrictive covenant to be implied,
the support for it must be "plain and unmistakable"
or it must be "necessary" as a matter of law.
AmJur.2d at § 173.
St. Benedict's DeveL Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 198 (Utah 1991).
Even where it can be found that an authority to restrict is implied, any exercise of
the authority "must be reasonable and made in good faith and must not be arbitrary
or capricious." Fink v. Miller, 896 P. 2d 649, 655 N. 7 (U. Apps. 1995). Further,
the rule of ejusdem generis applies. Under that rule, a general term like "alteration" will "be construed according to the specific enumerations" contained in the
grant of authority to regulate. Cafe Rio v. Larkin-Giffbrd-Overton, LLC, 207 P.3d
1235, 1240-1242 (Utah 2009); Freeman v. Gee, supra; Parrish v. Richards, supra.
Where, for example, the enumerations are of changes in use, no authority will be
implied to restrict changes in appearance. Id.
The district court's ruling on authority of the Design Committee under the
CC&R's was as follows:
The defendant has presented several issues in her
motion for summary judgment. Those issues are:
whether the CC&R's regulate colors; whether the
CC&R's grant control to the Design Review ComDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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mittee; whether the CC&R's have been abandoned;
whether the CC&R's have been uniformly enforced;
and whether the defendant's home is harmonious
with the other homes in the subdivision.
In addressing the first issue, the Court finds that
the CC&R's do regulate colors, despite the absence
of the word "colors" in the CC&R's. In paragraph
5.3 of the Amended CC&R's, it states that no building, fence, wall, tennis court, satellite dish or receiver, or outside antenna shall be altered without
the prior written approval of the Design Review
Committee. A change of color is clearly an alteration. Therefore, the defendant's changes to the colors of her door, entry way, etc. would clearly fall
under 15.3.
In addressing the second issue, the Court notes
that the paragraphs 4.3 and 5.3 of the CC&R's give
the Design Review Committee the authority to determine whether alterations, improvements, additions, etc. to the property are harmonious and architecturally compatible with other properties in the
subdivision. Therefore, the design Review Committee does have control and authority over such
changes, including the colors that might be changed.
Memorandum Decision 10/17/08. That is, the Design Committee has an implied
power, derivative of its power over "alterations", which extends beyond structural
alterations in use, to cover changes in paint color to a shade considered "too dark"
in its application to a garage door, though demonstrably less dark than shades of
the same color on, for example, roofs throughout the subdivision. This power is
absolute, as a court may not question the Design Committee's discretion under the
phrase "architecturally compatible."
The ruling is wrong on numerous grounds.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The District Court plainly did not construe the power alleged strictly, in favor of free, unrestricted use of the property.
Even if the power described were not merely implied, it could not be upheld
except "where — necessary for the protection of the business for the benefit of
which the covenant was made and no greater restraint is imposed than is reasonably necessary to secure such protection." St. Benedict's Devel. Co. v. St Benedict's
Hosp.y supra. There is not even a claim here that the restrictive power alleged
serves any purpose except the personal tastes of the Design Committee. No one
has suggested how the use of a "dark" shade of brown could be "architecturally incompatible" with other shades of brown regularly permitted, and, in fact, prescribed as colors naturally occurring in "wood" and "brick".
The implication of the alleged power plainly is not "necessary as a matter of
law." While such a claim might be made regarding structural "alterations" of use,
the glib conclusion that power over all things that might be called "alterations," including re-painting, is so fundamental to the nature of the subdivision, is not
merely unsupported, but insupportable. See Cafe Rio, supra; Freeman, supra;
Parrish, supra.
Finally, the conclusion that any imposition of its taste in colors by the Design Committee is beyond the power of courts is unreasonable on its face. The
mere recitation of the rubric "too dark," without a claim or showing that such use
of color otherwise regularly permitted is, or even could be, "architecturally incomDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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patible," does not begin to comply with the requirement that committee decisions
be "reasonable — in good faith and — not — arbitrary or capricious." The district court has conferred by implication a power which is mere caprice.
DISMISSAL WAS IMPROPER.
The district court never resolved the issue whether the alleged power to dictate paint colors had been uniformly enforced, or abandoned. It declined to grasp
that the overwhelming evidence of non-enforcement showed that no such power
could be implied, and that the alleged violation could not be asserted to be "architecturally incompatible."
The error in construction of the CC&R's, however, allowed appellee to enforce a power it did not have by lis pendens, preventing pending sale of the subject
realty. The imposition occurred slightly prior to the national collapse of real estate
prices, and deprived appellant of hundreds of thousands of dollars in value. Eventually, the deprivation drove appellant into bankruptcy.
Appellee then moved to dismiss its own complaint as moot, because appellant had lost the property:
" . . . Defendant no longer has standing to pursue either of her counterclaims. She has surrendered the Property . . . "
This neglected to note that appellee's own claim of authority remained before the court. This would be true even if it were correct that claim and defense

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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were now reduced to a question whether, by regular failure of enforcement, plaintiff had abandoned the authority claimed.
Article X, section 10.5 of the subject CC&R's provides:
If any party governed by the terms of this Declaration
defaults under any provision hereof, that defaulting
party shall pay all costs and attorney's fee incurred by
another party to enforce the provisions hereof,
whether incurred through formal lawsuit or otherwise.
Of course, plaintiff, as successor of the founder of the subdivision is a "party governed by the terms of this Declaration." Plaintiff is responsible for fees and costs
int his matter. This asserts a right which accrued at the time of filing of the original
action. What disposition was thereafter made of the property is irrelevant.
Further, the use of a lis pendens to block sale of the realty during the assertion of a non-existent power subjects appellee to a claims for wrongful use of civil
proceedings. The dismissal here prevents realization upon such claims by appellant.
CONCLUSIONS
The Court should reverse all rulings of the district court herein, reserving a
ruling on the issue of abandonment. The Court should then either remand the matter to the district court to complete a ruling on abandonment, or should remit the
parties to an assessment of fees and costs in favor of appellants, and such action for
wrongful proceedings as appellant deems appropriate.
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Respectfully submitted this 7th day of July, 2011.
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

BARTON WOODS HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION, INC., a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,

RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
and
RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S CROSSMOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
DENA STEWART, an individual, and JOHN
DOES 1-10,
Defendants.

and
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO STRDXE LIS PENDENS
Case No. 070700680
Judge Jon M. Memmott

There are currently three motions pending before the Court The Court has reviewed the
moving and responding papers for each motion, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court
DENIES defendant's motion for summary judgment, DENIES the plaintiffs cross-motion for
summary judgment, and also DENIES defendant's motion to strike lis pendens.

BACKGROUND
The plaintiff filed its complaint on December 11,2007. In that complaint, the plaintiff
alleged that Dena Stewart ("the defendant") had violated restrictive covenants for a planned unit
development. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had installed dark shutters on
the front exterior of her home, painted the garage door dark brown or brass, painted the entry to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the home a dark brown or brass, installed or painted the mailbox dark brown or brass, and
installed rocks on portions of thefrontexterior walls of the home. The restrictive covenants
(CC&R's) required improvements to be approved by the Design Review Committee, and the
plaintiff alleged that the defendant had not received approval before making these improvements.
The plaintiff also alleged that these improvements violated the CC&R's because they were not
harmonious with the other homes in the PUD.
The defendant filed her answer to the complaint on January 9,2008. In that answer, the
defendant noted that the subdivision has many similar' Violations," and so it appeared that the
CC&R's had been abandoned, at least in part, by the plaintiffs. The defendant also filed a
counterclaim against the plaintiffs, alleging that because the CC&R's stated that all structures
must be builtfrombrick, wood, or stucco, all of the homes in the PUD were in violation because
they had windows and doors that included materials such as glass.1
The defendant then filed an amended answer and counterclaim on January 17,2008. In
the amended counterclaim, the defendant alleged that the plaintiff had allowed owners of lots on
both sides of her home to encroach on her lot, causing damages of at least $250,000. The plaintiff
filed a reply to the amended counterclaim on February 7,2008.
On April 1,2008, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. In her
memorandum in support of that motion, the defendant argued that the CC&R's do not regulate
colors. The defendant also argued that the colors she used are 6Chaimonious," and that the "rocks"
that were allegedly in violation of the CC&R's were in fact bricks. The defendant noted that at
least two other homes in the PUD have "rocks" on their walls. The defendant included pictures

The Court notes that this argument is without merit, because such a strict reading of the CC&R's would
clearly lead to an absurd result

Page 2 of 13
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of many homes that she alleged were in the PUD, and which she argued used colors that were
similar to those used on her home. Thus, argued the defendant, her home was "harmonious"
with other homes in the PUD, and that the plaintiff has either discriminatory enforced the
CC&R's or simply abandoned them.
On April 22,2008, the plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to the defendant's
motion for summary judgment In that memorandum, the plaintiff argued that there was a
genuine dispute of material fact relating to the photographs presented by the defendant. The '
plaintiff also noted that the defendant did not provide any testimony to authenticate the
photographs, and the photographs were therefore not competent evidence. In addition, the
defendant included no other affidavits to show that the CC&R's have been abandoned or not
uniformly enforced.
The plaintiff then argued that the CC&R's have not been abandoned and have been
uniformly applied throughout the development. The plaintiff attached an affidavit from the
plaintiffs president, Paul Mifeud, in support of its argument. The plaintiff requested that the
Court grant a Rule 56(f) continuance to allow the parties to conduct discovery.
In addition, the plaintiff argued that the amended CC&R's place architectural control in
the Design Review Committee. The defendant did not obtain permissionfromthe Design Review
Committee to make the changes to her property. The plaintiff argued that failure to do so was a
violation of the CC&R's, and Paul Mifsud's affidavit demonstrated that the CC&R's had not
been abandoned. That affidavit also stated that "[t]o the extent other violations have been
identified on other properties within the development, those violations are in the process of being
appropriately remedied by the association."
The plaintiff thenfileda cross-motion for summary judgment on April 24, 2008. In its
memorandum in support: of that motion, the plaintiff argued that the CC&R's required the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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defendant to obtain prior written approval from the Design Review Committee before making
any alterations to her property. Because she failed to do so, the'plaintiff argued, and because the
defendant has admitted that she failed to do so, it is clear that the defendant has violated the
CC&R's.
The defendant filed her reply memorandum in support of her motion for summary
judgment on May 1,2008 and a memorandum in opposition to the plaintiffs cross-motion for
summary judgment on May 12,2008. In those memoranda, the defendant argued that the
affidavit of Paul Mifsud should be stricken in its entirety because it isfilledwith statements that
are irrelevant, contain legal conclusions, and because it was not notarized. The defendant noted
that Mr. Mifsud's affidavit included an admission that there were other violations in the
subdivision.
The defendant also argued that her motion for summary judgment should be granted
because the CC&R's did not prescribe or prohibit colors, and because other homes contained
similar colors, demonstrating either that the CC&R's have been arbitrarily enforced or that they
have been abandoned. Finally, the defendant noted that because it appeared that there are other
violations in the subdivision, the requirement to obtain prior approval has either been waived or
the plaintiff has arbitrarily enforced the CC&R's.
The plaintiff filed a reply memorandum in support of its cross-motion for summary
judgment on May 21,2008. The plaintiff argued that the defendant has failed to submit any
record evidence to dispute the fact that the defendant failed to obtain prior written approval
before altering her property. The plaintiff noted that it is not an individual homeowner's right to
determine whether changes to a property are "harmonious." Instead, that right has been given to
the Design Review Committee. Because the defendant did not seek approval from the Design
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were not harmonious. The Review Committee has determined that the changes are not
harmonious, and that determination was not arbitrary and capricious, as shown by the fact that
the defendant's home is the only home with a brown garage door, exterior brown shutters, rock
facing, and wood accents.
The defendant submitted her motion for decision on May 19, 2008, and the plaintiff
submitted its motion for decision on May 21,2008. The Court conducted a hearing on both
motions on August 18,2008. The defendant filed an affidavit from Shaun Shepherd on August
15,2008, and the plaintifif objected to the affidavit as untimely. There was some discussion about
the pictures submitted by the defendant, and the plaintiff argued that at least one picture was of a
home located outside of the subdivision.
On September 16,2008, before the Court had issued its ruling on the motions for
summary judgment, the defendant filed a motion to strike the lis pendens that was placed on her
home by the plaintiff. The defendant noted 'that under Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-2,2 the filing of a
lis pendens is restricted to actions affecting title to, or the right of possession of, real property. In
this case, the action does not affect the title of the defendant, because the plaintiff has only
sought injunctive relief. Therefore, there is no possibility that her title to the property will be
affected by this litigation. This action would also not affect her right of possession of the
property.
The Court scheduled a hearing for September 24,2008. On that same day, the plaintiff
filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion to strike the lis pendens.3 The plaintiff argued
that because the plaintiff may succeed in this litigation, the defendant could eventually be ordered

2

3

This statue was recently recodified as Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-1303.
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to remove the alterations she has placed on her property. If that occurs, and the defendant had
sold the home, the new owner would be subject to the order. Therefore, the plaintiff argued, any
prospective purchasers should be put on notice of the ongoing litigation, and thefilingof a lis
pendens is appropriate in this case. The plaintiff cited to cases from Colorada and Arizona in
support of its position.
The Court conducted a hearing on September 24,2008, and informed the parties that it
would include the ruling on the motion to strike Us pendens in its ruling on the motions for
summary judgment. Having reviewed the papersfromboth parties, and having reviewed the
applicable case law, the Court now issues its ruling on all three motions.
ANALYSIS
As noted above, there are currently three motions pending before the Court: the
defendant's motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment,
and the defendant's motion to strike the Us pendens. The Court will address each of those
motions separately below.
A.

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment

The defendant has presented several issues in her motion for summary judgment. Those
issues are: whether the CC&R's regulate colors; whether the CC&R's grant control to the Design
Review Committee; whether the CC&R's have been abandoned; whether the CC&R's have been
uniformly enforced; and whether the defendant's home is harmonious with the other homes in
the subdivision.
In addressing the first issue, the Courtfindsthat the CC&R's do regulate colors, despite
the absence of the word "colors" in the CC&R's. In paragraph 5.3 of the Amended CC&R's, it
states that no building, fence, wall, tennis court, satelhte dish or receiver, or outside antenna shall
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is clearly an alteration. Therefore, the defendant's changes to the colors of her door, entry way,
" etc. would clearly fall under f 5.3. •
In addressing the second issue, the Court notes that the paragraphs 4.3 and 5.3 of the
CC&R's give the Design Review Committee the authority to determine whether alterations, .!
improvements, additions, etc. to the property are harmonious and architecturally compatible with
other properties in the subdivision. Therefore, the Design Review Committee does have control
and authority over such changes, including the colors that might be changed.
The defendant has also argued that her home is harmonious with the other homes in the
subdivision. The Court notes that it agrees that at least some of the pictures depict homes that
appear to the Court to be quite similar to the defendant's home, and the Court believes that her
home is harmonious with the other homes. However, even if these homes are in the same
subdivision, this Court does not have the authority to override the Design Review Committee's
determination that tie defendant's home is not harmonious with the other homes. The only
determination that can be made by this Court is whether the CC&R's have been abandoned or
whether the Design Review Committee has arbitrarily enforced the CC&R's.
In support of her motion, the defendant submitted a number of pictures demonstrating
that her home was hannonious, and that any determination to the contrary must have been
arbitrary and capricious. However, as noted by the plaintiff, the defendant never authenticated
those photographs. The Court has also never received a street map for the subdivision in
question, and it is impossible to determine whether all of the homes shown in the photographs
are actually located in this subdivision. As noted above, there was a question presented at the
August 18 hearing about whether one home was even located in the subdivision.
In determining whether the CC&R's have been abandoned, the Court must determine
whether "the average Digitized
person,by upon
inspection
of Library,
a subdivision
andLaw
knowing
of a certain
the Howard
W. Hunter Law
J. Reuben Clark
School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

restriction, will readily observe sufficient violations so that he or she will logically infer that the
property owners neither adhere to nor enforce the restriction." Fink v. Miller, 896 P.2d 649, 653
(Utah Ct. App. 1995). The Court must therefore be able to view the subdivision, either through
photographs or by visiting the subdivision. Because the photographs have not been authenticated,
there is no admissible evidence presented to the Court that allows the Court to view the
subdivision, and the Court cannot determine whether the CC&R's have been abandoned or
arbitrarily enforced.
However, it is clear that if some homes share the same colors as those used by the
defendant, and those homes were approved by the Design Review Committee while the
defendant's was not, this Court couldfindthat the Design Review Committee acted arbitrarily or
capriciously.
Because the defendant has not submitted evidence demonstrating that there is no genuine
issue of material fact as to whether the CC&R's have been abandoned or arbitrarily enforced, the
Court must DENY the defendant's motion for summary judgment.
B.

Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment

The plaintiff has correctly argued that the defendant has admitted that she did not obtain
prior approvalfromthe Design Review Committee. As noted above, the Courtfindsthat the
alterations made by the defendant do fall under the CC&R's for this subdivision, and two
provisions of the CC&R's require homeowners to obtain approvalfromthe Design Review
Committee for alterations or improvements to the property. Therefore, it is clear that the
defendant has violated at least one provision of the CC&R' s.
The plaintiff also correctly noted in its reply memorandum that the defendant has set forth
no admissible evidence to demonstrate that these provisions of the CC&R's have been
abandoned The defendant
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August 18 hearing. The plaintiff has argued that this affidavit should be stricken as untimely. The
Court finds that it need not rule on the admissibility of Mr. Shepherd's affidavit, submitted
by the defendant, because an affidavit submitted by the plaintiff demonstrates that the CC&R's
may have been abandoned, and specifically that the requirement for prior approval of the Design
Review Committee might have been abandoned.
In Paul Mifsud's affidavit, dated April 21,2008, he states that "[t]o the extent other
CC&R violations have been identified on other properties within the development, those
violations are in the process of being appropriately remedied by the association." That statement
clearly demonstrates that there are other violations in this subdivision. It is not clear how many
violations there are, or when these violations occurred. If there are other violations, it is clear that
the homeowners committing those violations did not obtain prior approval from the Design
Review Committee. Therefore, the inference to be madefromthe plaintiffs own affidavit is that
this provision of the CC&R's may well have been abandoned. All inferences must be interpreted
in favor of the party opposing the motion for summary judgment. Johnson v. Morton Thiokol,
Inc., 818 P.2d 997,1000 (Utah 1991). As noted by the defendant, the homeowner's association
cannot simply resurrect CC&R's that have been abandoned, because once CC&R's have been
abandoned, they are no longer enforceable. Therefore, the Court must determine whether the
CC&R's have been abandoned, and it appeals that there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to
thatissue.
The Court must therefore DENY the plaintiffs cross-motion for summary judgment
C.

Defendant's Motion to Strike Lis Pendens

Thefinalmotion pending before the Court is the defendant's motion to strike the lis
pendens. A notice of recording of lis pendens wasfiledby the plaintiff on December 17,2007.
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of a lis pendens is appropriate. Specifically, a lis pendens can only befiledwhen an action affects
"the title to, or the right of possession of, real property." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-1303(l). The
defendant has argued that because this current case can have no effect on her title to or
possession of the property, thefilingof a lis pendens was improper and the lis pendens should be
stricken.
The plaintiff has argued that case lawfromother states demonstrates that the words
"affecting title to" have a broad meaning, and because this action may result in corrective action
to the defendant's property, individuals who may have a future interest in the defendant's
property (such as a prospective purchaser) should be put on notice that corrective action may be
taken. The plaintiff cited the cases of Hammersley v. District Court, 610 P.2d 94 (Colo. 1980)
and Tucson Estates, Inc., v. Superior Court, 729 P.2d 954 (Ariz. Ct App. 1986) in support of its
position.
It is true that both of those cases included analysis of statutes regarding thefilingof a lis
pendens which used language similar to that used in Utah's statute. In the cases cited by the
plaintiff, the courts adopted a broad interpretation of the words "affect title in real property." The
Colorado Supreme Court held that "although the present litigation does not seek to change
ownership in any way, it does involve the determination of certain rights incident to ownership
and in that sense affects title to real property." Hammersley, 610 P.2d 94, 96 (Colo. 1980). In
Tucson Estates, Inc., the Arizona Court of Appeals specifically stated that it agreed with the
analysis of the Colorado Supreme Court in the Hammersley case. 729 P.2d at 958.
As noted by both parties, there is no Utah case law that addresses the relationship
between a case involving CC&R's and thefilingof a lis pendens.4 However, the Court has
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discovered one case that includes language that appears to show that Utah courts should adopt
the more liberal interpretation encouraged by the plaintiff. In Winters v. Schulman, the Utah
y
Court of Appeals stated that "[t]he recording of a lis pendens serves as a warning to all persons
that any rights or interests they may acquire in the interim are subject to the judgment or
decreed 977 P.2d 1218,1222 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (citingBagnall v. Suburbia Land Co., 519
P.2d 914,916 (Utah 1978)) (emphasis added). In the next sentence of the decision, however, the
Utah Court of Appeals stated that "the primary purpose of section 78-40-2 is to provide
prospective purchasers with notice of litigation affecting title to or possession of property located
in Utah." That sentence, on its own, is merely a recitation of the language of the statute, and
when the plain language of the statute is interpreted, it appears that thefilingof a lis pendens is
only appropriate in cases in which title to the property may change or the individual's right of
possession may be taken away.
Thus, this Courtfindsthat the possibly contradictory language used by the Court of
Appeals in Winters does not clearly demonstrate which approach this Court should take in
interpreting the statute. However, after reviewing the case lawfromColorado and Arizona, and
noting that the purpose of a lis pendens is to apprise potential future owners of property of
pending litigation involving the property, this Courtfindsthat it should adopt the more liberal
interpretation of the words "affecting the title to, or therightof possession of..." the property.
Utah Code Ann. § 78B~6-1303(1).
In this case, anyrightsa prospective purchaser would acquire would be subject to this
Court's determination. For example, if the Courtfindsthat the defendant violated the CC&R's
and orders her to repaint portions of her home, and the defendant sells the home, the new owner
would still be required to repaint those portions, of the home. It would be unfair to allow the new
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owner to purchase the home without warning the new owner of the potential actions the new
owner would be required to take, and avoiding that unfair result is the purpose of the filing of a
lis pendens.
The Court therefore finds that it is appropriate for a party to file a notice of lis pendens in
a case in which alleged violations of CC&R's are at issue and corrective action could potentially
be ordered by the Court.
CONCLUSION
The defendant's motion for summary judgment is DENIED. The plaintiffs cross-motion
for summary judgment is also DENIED.
The defendant's motion to strike hs pendens is DENIED, because the Court finds that the
purpose of Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-1303 is best fulfilled by allowing a notice of hs pendens to
befiledand thereby warn a prospective purchaser that he/she could be subject to the Court's
judgment in this case.
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY
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BARTON WOODS HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION, INC.,
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RULING ON DEFENDANT'S RENEWED
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff
Case No. 070700680

vs.

Judge Jon M. Memmott

DENA STEWART; and JOHN DOES 1-10,
Defendants.

i

•.

This matter is before the Court on the defendant's renewed motion for summary
judgment The Court has reviewed the moving and responding papers, along with their
supporting documentation. The Court also held a hearing on the matter on June 8, 2009. Having
considered all of the arguments, being fiilly advised in the premises, and for the reasons set forth
herein, the Court DENIES the defendant's motion.

BACKGROUND
The plaintiff filed its complaint in this matter on December 11,2007, claiming that the
defendant's house violated the subdivision's restrictive covenants. Specifically, the plaintiff
alleged that the defendant violated the restrictive covenants by: (1) installing dark shutters on her
home's front exterior walls; (2) painting her garage door a dark color; (3) painting the entry to
her home a dark color; (4) installing and/or painting her mailbox a dark color; and (5) installing
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rocks on portions of her home'sfrontexterior walls. On January 9,2008, the defendant filed her
answer to the plaintiffs complaint, denying liability.
Thereafter, on April 1,2008, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. In her
accompanying supporting memorandum, the defendant argued that the subdivision's restrictive
covenants did not regulate color, and that regardless, the colors of her home were harmonious
with other homes in the subdivision. The defendant also asserted that the "rocks" on the exterior
walls of her home were, in fact, bricks, and thus did not violate the restrictive covenants. To
support her arguments, the defendant included several pictures of homes alleged to be within the
subdivision, which she asserted demonstrated the harmonious quality of her home and argued
that the plaintiff either discnminatorily enforced the subdivision's restrictive covenants or
abandoned them altogether.
The plaintiff filed its memorandum in opposition to the defendant's motion on April 22,
2008. In its opposition, the plaintiff argued that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding
whether the restrictive covenants were discriminatorily enforced and/or abandoned. The plaintiff
asserted that the pictures submitted by the defendant were not authenticated, and therefore were
inadmissible. The plaintiff submitted that the restrictive covenants are uniformly applied
throughout the subdivision and have not been abandoned. The plaintiff also asserted that the
restrictive covenants placed architectural control of changes to the subdivision's homes in the
subdivision's Design Review Committee and argued that because the defendant did not obtain
permission to make the complained of changes to her home, she violated the restrictive
covenants. The plaintiff thenfileda cross-motion for summary judgment on April 24,2008,
which argued the same.
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On October 17,2008, following complete briefing of the parties' motion and crossmotion and a hearing on the matters, the Court issued its ruling on the motions. In its ruling, the
Court found that the subdivision's restrictive covenants do regulate changes to homes' colors and
that the subdivision's Design Review Committee had the authority to determine whether
proposed changes were harmonious and architecturally compatible with other homes in the
subdivision. The Court noted, however, that it did not have the authority to override the
Committee's determination of harmoniousness, but that it could only make a determination as to
the issues of discriminatory enforcement and abandonment of the restrictive covenants. The
Court then found that these issues were fact dependant and that because the defendant had not
submitted competent evidence of the same, genuine issues of material fact existed, which
precluded summary judgment on the defendant's motion. Further, the Court found that while the
defendant did violate the restrictive covenants' provision requiring prior approval of changes, the
evidence submitted demonstrated that other homeowners in the subdivision had also violated that
requirement, which leads to the inference that the restrictive covenants may be discriminatorily
enforced. Ultimately, however, the Court determined that evidence regarding the issue was
lacking. Accordingly, the Court concluded that because genuine issues of material fact existed as
to the issues of discriminatory enforcement and abandonment of the restrictive covenants,
summary judgment was also inappropriate on the plaintiffs cross-motion.
Subsequently, on January 29,2008, Ihe defendant renewed her motion for summary
judgment. In her supporting memorandum, the defendant reasserted her prior arguments
regarding discriminatory enforcement and abandonment of the subdivision's restrictive
covenants. The defendant again also submitted pictures of the subdivision's homes to support of
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her arguments. These pictures were attached as exhibits to the Affidavit of Shaun Shepherd.
Particularly, the defendant asserted that the home on the "Clubhouse Property" in the subdivision
is subject to the restrictive covenants, but nevertheless, did not comply with the harmonious and
architecturally compatible requirements the plaintiff seeks to enforce in this litigation.
Accordingly, the defendant submitted that because the plaintiff did not take the necessary steps
to ensure the Clubhouse Property's compliance with the restrictive covenants, considered in
conjunction with the subdivision's other homes' violations, the subdivision's restrictive
covenants must have either been abandoned or discriminatorily enforced.
On March 23,2009, the plaintiff filed its memorandum in opposition to the defendant's
renewed motion for summary judgment.2 In its opposition, the plaintiff argued that despite the
defendant's authentication of the previously submitted pictures of the subdivision's homes, the
pictures still do not establish that no material issues of fact exist regarding the issues of
abandonment and/or discriminatory enforcement of the restrictive covenants. The plaintiff

1

In his affidavit, Mr. Shepherd indicated that he had taken the pictures and that each depicted a home within the
subdivision, as shown by the addresses and lot numbers accompanying the picture exhibits. The picture exhibits also
included Mr. Shepherd's commentary regarding the homes' features and what he believed were violations of the
subdivision's restrictive covenants.
2
On February 17,2009, the plaintiff filed a motion to stay briefing and determination of the defendant's renewed
motion for summary judgment In its accompanying supporting memorandum, the plaintiff asserted that an
automatic stay of proceedings was necessary due to the defendant's filing for bankruptcy. On March 4,2009, die
defendant filed a reply to the plaintiffs motion to stay, arguing that a stay was unnecessary and that the plaintiff's
motion should be treated as its response to her renewed motion. On March 5, 2009, the plaintiff filed a request to
submit for decision regarding its motion to stay. Subsequently, on March 9,2009, the defendant filed a notice to
submit for decision regarding her renewed motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff objected to the defendant's
notice to submit on March 10,2009, asserting that briefing was not complete and that the Court's determination on
its motion to stay would affect when its response to the defendant's renewed motion is due. The defendant filed a
response to the plaintiff's objection on March 13,2009. In her response, the defendant asserted that her bankruptcy
filing had been withdrawn and that the plaintiff's response to her renewed motion should be filed "forthwith." On
the same day, the plaintiff filed a suggestion of mootness regarding its motion to stay and indicated that its response
to the defendant's renewed motion would be filed by March 23,2009. On April 17,2009, the Court issued its ruling
on the plaintiff's motion to stay,findingthat the motion was moot Due to die procedural complexities resulting
from die defendant's bankruptcy filing and the plaintiff's motion to stay, and the defendant's subsequent willingness
to accept the plaintiff's potentially untimely memorandum in opposition as demonstrated in her response to the
plaintiff's objection to her request to submit and the filing of subsequent pleadings, the Court will accept the
plaintiff's memorandum in opposition and consider it as a timely response to the defendant's renewed motion.
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disputed whether the subdivision's restrictive covenants applied to the Clubhouse Property due
to its initial common ownership between the subdivision and an adjacent condominium project.
The plaintiff also addressed the compliance of each of the homes depicted in the defendant's
picture exhibits. The plaintiff averred that the issues of abandonment and discriminatory
enforcement of the restrictive covenants are fact intensive and not appropriate for summary
judgment in this matter. The plaintiff then requested the Court deny the defendant's motion and
allow the parties to conduct discovery on the abandonment and discriminatory enforcement
issues.3
On April 8,2009, the defendant filed her reply memorandum in support of her renewed
motion for summary judgment, hi her reply, the defendant asserted that it is unclear who owned
or presently owns the Clubhouse Property from the submitted documents; nevertheless, the
defendant posited that since the home on the property is not a multi-family structure, unlike the
adjacent condominium project, and lies on the subdivision's side of the street, the Clubhouse
Property must be subject to the subdivision's restrictive covenants.4 Further, the defendant
asserted that her picture exhibits clearly demonstrate that the home on the Clubhouse Property is
3

Also on March 23,2009, the plaintiff filed a motion to strike portions of the Affidavit of Shaun Shepherd. In its
accompanying supporting memorandum, the plaintiff argued that Mr. Shepherd's commentary within the picture
exhibits regarding the depicted homes' compliance with the subdivision's restrictive covenants is inadmissible due
to lack of foundation, hearsay and Mr. Shepherd making improper legal conclusions. In her response to the
plaintiff's motion to strike, filed April 8,2009, the defendant asserted that the plaintiffs dispute of Mr. Shepherd's
commentary was irrelevant, as the plaintiff did not question the accuracy of the pictures. On April 17,2009, the
plaintiff filed a request to submit for decision regarding its motion to strike. The defendant objected to the plaintiff's
request to submit on April 30,2009, arguing that the matter should be addressed and decided in conjunction with her
renewed motion for summary judgment In the Court's review Mr. Shepherd's affidavit, it appears that the
commentary included with the picture exhibits, as well as the list of violations exhibit, lack foundation and draw
improper legal conclusions. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the plaintiff's motion to strike as to those portions of
Mr. Shepherd's affidavit
4
Notably, the defendant makes her argument that the Clubhouse Property must be subject to the subdivision's
restrictive covenants admittedly without reviewing the actual special warranty deed that conveyed the home on the
Clubhouse Property to its cuirent owner. The defendant merely assumes that the special warranty deed is "in the
usual form" and "excepts rights previously conveyed" to the adjacent condominium project See Reply to
Opposition to Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, 3-4. Further, this document was not submitted to the Court
for review.
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not harmonious with the subdivision's other homes and that the number and type of violations on
the subdivision's other homes establishes that the restrictive covenants were either abandoned or
are discriminatorily enforced. Finally, the defendant submitted that the plaintiff's attempts at
redefining the restrictive covenants' requirements create an arbitrary and capricious standard
upon which the subdivision's Design Review Committee may withhold its permission to make
changes to the subdivision's homes. Accordingly, the defendant argued that even if the
restrictive covenants are not abandoned, the unfettered discretion given to the Committee is
impermissible and per se discriminatory enforcement
On April 21,2009, the defendant filed a notice to submit for decision regarding her
renewed motion for summary judgment and requested a hearing on the matter. The Court held
such hearing on June 8,2009. At this hearing, the parties reasserted their prior arguments and the
Court took the matter under advisement. Accordingly, the Courtfindsthe defendant's renewed
motion for summary judgment is nowripefor determination.5
ANALYSIS
Summary judgment is appropriate only when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions onfile,together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). However, "the evidence and all inferences that may be
reasonably drawn from the evidence must be liberally construed in favor of the party opposing
the motion" Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d 997,1000 (Utah 1991).
* On July 14,2009, the plaintiff filed a notice of bankruptcy filing regarding the defendant This notice indicated that
the defendant filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy on June 15, 2009. On July 27,2009, the defendant filed an objection
to the plaintiffs notice, asserting that a stay in proceedings is unnecessary and should not be used to delay the
Court's ruling on her renewed motion. The Courtfindsthat since the matter was taken under advisement prior to the
defendant's bankruptcy filing and in the interest of moving this litigation forward, such filing will not stay the
Court's determination on the renewed motion. However, the Court shall stay proceedings in this case following the
issuance of this Ruling.
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"Restrictive covenants are a common method of effectuating private residential
developmental schemes." Swenson v. Erickson, 998 P.2d 807, 813 (Utah 2000). "As a general
proposition, property owners who have purchased laud [sic] in a subdivision, subject to a
recorded set of restrictive covenants and conditions, have therightto enforce such restrictions
through equitablereliefagainst property owners who do not comply with the stated restrictions."
Fink v. Miller, 896 P.2d 649,652 (Utah Ct App. 1995). "Conduct by property owners within a
development, however, may terminate and render unenforceable a particular covenant where
such conduct so substantially changes the character of the neighborhood as to neutralize the
benefit of the covenant, or constitutes evidence of the abandonment of the covenant" Swenson,
998 P.2d at 813 (Internal citations omitted).
"The case law is uniform that before an abandonment of a covenant may be found there
must be substantial and general noncompliance with the covenant" Swenson, 998 P.2d at 813
(Internal quotations omitted). "The violations must be so substantial as to destroy the usefulness
of the covenant and support afindingthat the covenant has become burdensome." Id. However,
"[i]f the original purpose of the covenant can still be accomplished and substantial benefit will
continue to inure to residents, the covenant will stand." Id. "Courts are uniform that no
abandonment of a covenant will be found where violations are of a minor nature and do not
destroy the general building scheme, if the violations are slight, unimportant, and unsubstantial,
or if the violations are inoffensive." Id. (Internal quotations and citations omitted). Further,
"[e]vidence of abandonment must be established by clear and convincing evidence." Id}
The test for abandonment, "[i]n simplest terms, is met when the average person, upon
inspection of a subdivision and knowing of a certain restriction, will readily observe sufficient
6

It is also noteworthy that the "[abandonment of one covenant does not suggest abandonment of other, albeit
similar, covenants in the agreement" Fink, 896 PJ2d at 655.
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violations so that he or she will logically infer that the property owners neither adhere to nor
enforce the restriction." Fink, 896 P.2d at 653 (Internal quotations omitted). The Utah Supreme
Court has adopted a three-part test for determining whether a subdivision has abandoned its
restrictive covenant, to wit:
"[Courts] must examine: (1) the 'number, nature and severity of the then
existing violations'; (2) 'any prior act of enforcement of the restriction';
and (3) 'whether it is still possible to realize to a substantial degree the
benefits intended through the covenant.'"
Swenson, 998 P.2d at 814 (quoting Fink, 896 P.2d at 653-54). In discussing the application of
this three-part test, the Utah Court of Appeals has stated that:
"To maximize the benefits of the essentially objective quality of this test,
courts applying it should first analyze violations as to their number,
nature, and severity. If these elements alone are sufficient to lead the
average person to believe the covenant has been abandoned, it is not
necessary to go further. However, if abandonment is still in doubt, courts
should then consider the other two factors—namely, prior enforcement
efforts and possible realization of benefits-to resolve the abandonment
question."
Fm£,896P.2dat653. 7
Here5 the defendant seeks summary judgment on the issues of whether the subdivision's
restrictive covenants regarding the color of shutters, garage doors, entrances to homes, and
mailboxes, as well as the installation of rocks on a home's front exterior walls, have been
abandoned and/or discriminatorily enforced, thus calling for the dismissal of the plaintiffs
claims against her. The plaintiff on the other hand, argues that the restrictive covenants have not
been abandoned nor discriminatorily enforced, but regardless, genuine issues of material fact
exist, which preclude summary judgment.
Additionally, and irrespective of the abandonment issue, a subdivision's enforcement of its restrictive covenants
may not be made in a discriminatory manner. In this respect, the Utah Court of Appeals has stated that, "[o]f course,
an architectural committee's decisions made in the course of the approval or denial of prospective house plans and
specifications must be reasonable and made in good faith and must not be arbitrary or capricious." Fink, 896 P.2d at
655 n.7.
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To support her arguments, and in an attempt to demonstrate that the subdivision's
restrictive covenants have been abandoned and/or discriminatorily enforced, the defendant has
submitted several pictures of the subdivision's homes. While these picture exhibits were
authenticated by the Affidavit of Shaun Shepherd, unlike with their previous submission in
. defendant's original motion for summary judgment, the Courtfindsthat these pictures alone do
not demonstrate by number, nature and severity, evidence sufficient to lead the average person to
believe the restrictive covenants at issue have been abandoned.
First, with respect toflherestrictive covenants regarding the color of shutters, garage
doors, entrances to homes, and mailboxes, the picture exhibits do show that some homes in the
subdivision appear to violate the restrictive covenants' harmonious color standard.8 Specifically,
the picture exhibits show thatfifteen(15) of the subdivision's forty-eight (48) completed homes,9
including the defendant's home (lot 109), have darker coloredfrontdoors and/or front
%
-

entrances.10 It also appears that fourteen (14) of the homes have darker colored trim and/or twotoned bricks.11 Further, three (3) of the homes, as depicted, have mailboxes that are darker
colored.12 Additionally, a dark colored wooden deck appears on one (1) property, a green chainlink fence appears on one (1) property, two (2) homes have green-striped awnings above
windows, and one (1) home has a copper valance above a window.13 However, the defendant's
home appears to be the only home in the subdivision with dark colored wooden shutters, a
8

It is noteworthy, however, that many of the defendant's picture exhibits do not adequately depict the areas of the
subdivision's homes that are relevant to this matter. Specifically, several of.the picture exhibits do not show a clear
view of the homes'frontentrances, mailboxes or garages.
9
Three (3) of the properties depicted in the defendant's picture exhibits include unfinished homes and a vacant lot,
and thus do not aid in die Court's abandonment or discriminatory enforcement determination. See Affidavit of
Shaun Shepherd, Exhibit 1, lots 201,413, and414.
10
Seeld., lots 109,206,302,309,310,311,312,401,407/408,415,504, 507,509,510, and511.
11
See Id^ lots 105/106,107,203,304,307,308,408, 501,502,503, 504, 505,506, and 507.
12
See Id., lots 109,302, and 303.
13
See Id^ lots 108,403,405 f 406, and 512.
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non-white garage door, and rock-like trim.14 Further, while the number of homes with darker
colored front doors and/orfrontentrances and trim and/or two-toned bricks is significant, the
nature and severity of the darker colors do not appear to be as severe as that of the defendant's
home. Accordingly, the Courtfindsthat the picture exhibits submitted by the defendant leave
doubt as to the abandonment of the restrictive covenants at issue. Simply put, it cannot be said
that the violations are so substantial and widespread that the Court's analysis need not go beyond
thefirst-prongof the abandonment test. Therefore, because the Courtfindsthat the evidence
submitted does not sufficiently establish abandonment under thefirst-prongof the abandonment
test, the Court must consider the next two (2) prongs of the test. See Fink, 896 P.2d at 653.
The second prong of the abandonment test relates to any prior acts of enforcement of the
restrictive covenants. See Swenson, 998 P.2d at 814 (quoting Fink, 896 P.2d at 653-54). Here, the
defendant's argument primarily relies on the noncompliance of the home on the Clubhouse
Property. As depicted in the defendant's picture exhibits, the Clubhouse Property home appears
clearly different from the homes in the subdivision. See Affidavit of Shaun Shepherd, Exhibit 4.
The Clubhouse Property home contains rock-like trim, darker colored wooden doors and/or
shutters, and a darker colored garage door. However, the parties dispute whether the
subdivision's restrictive covenants apply to the Clubhouse Property home. Further, the parties
have not provided the Court with the necessary documentation for it render a decision on
whether the Clubhouse Property home is subject to the subdivision's restrictive covenants.
Specifically, and as acknowledged and argued by the defendant in her reply memorandum, the
abstract of documents submitted by the plaintiff while showing what documents have been

14

The Court notes that the parties have not submitted competent evidence as to whether the trim on the defendant's
home is, in fact, rock or whether it is merely brick made to look like rock. Accordingly, the Courtfindsthat this feet
remains in dispute.
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recorded on the property, does not show the content or affect of such documents. Moreover, the
defendant's assumptions regarding the contents of documents within the property's chain of title,
in particular the special warranty deed that conveyed the Clubhouse Property home to its current
owner, are insufficient for the Court properly construe the myriad of deeds and agreements that
potentially affect whether the Clubhouse Property home is subject to the subdivision's restrictive
covenants. Accordingly, the Courtfindsthat material issues of feet exist regarding the
applicability of the Clubhouse Property home's appearance to the Court's determination of
abandonment and/or discriminatory enforcement of the restrictive covenants.
Additionally, neither party has submitted competent evidence regarding specific acts of
prior enforcement of the restrictive covenants at issue. The Court's ruling on the parties' prior
motion and cross-motion for summary judgjnent found that it was clear that not all homeowners
in the subdivision obtained prior approval for the changes to their homes. However, the plaintiff
has alleged that the owners of those homes exhibiting violations were notified of the violations,
and that such violations are being remedied. See Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's
Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit G. Nevertheless, this after-the-fact attempt to
enforce the restrictive covenants likely may not be sufficient to withstand an abandonment
finding. See Fink, 896 P.2d at 654 ("Given the significant number of houses with nonconforming
roofing materials in Maple Hills, uniformity of development-at least with respect to that
particular design element—cannot be accomplished by belated enforcement of the covenant.").
Further, while the defendant has made informal requests for information pertaining to prior acts
of enforcement, these requests were not made as part of formal discovery and the Court has not
been provided with relevant information or admissible evidence on the issue. Accordingly, the
Courtfindsthat genuine issues of material fact exist as to the prior acts of enforcement of the
Page 11
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subdivision's restrictive covenants and the second-prong of the abandonment test may not be
determined at this time.15
Similarly, the parties have presented no evidence as to the third-prong of the
abandonment test, i.e. whether it is still possible to realize to a substantial degree the benefits
intended through the covenant, and have made little to no argument, beyond conclusory
statements, regarding the same. The Court thereforefindsthat genuine issues of material fact
exist as to the third-prong of the abandonment test with regard to the restrictive covenants at
issue in this matter.
Accordingly, because the Courtfindsthat genuine issues of material fact exist as to the
issues of abandonment and discriminatory enforcement of the subdivision's restrictive
covenants, the Court must DENY the defendant's renewed motion for summary judgment,16

15

The foregoing analysis is equally applicable to the defendant's argument that the subdivision's restrictive
covenants have been discriminatorily enforced. While it is true that the harmonious standard applied by the
subdivision's Design Review Committee has subjective elements, it is unclear to the Court whether the Committee
has established protocols and standards for making their determinations and whether the Committee has actually
foUowed such protocols and standards. Competent evidence on these issues is simply lacking. Accordingly, the
Court finds that genuine issues of material fact exist as to the defendant's argument that the subdivision's restrictive
covenants are discriminatorily enforced However, the Court again notes, as it did in its prior ruling on the parties'
motion and cross-motion for summary judgment, that if some of the subdivision's homes that share similar colors to
those of the defendant's home were approved by the subdivision's Design Review Committee while the defendant's
was not, the Court could find that the restrictive covenants were arbitrarily and capriciously enforced.
16
The Court notes at this time that parties' respective positions regarding the restrictive covenants at issue in this
matter are relatively weak. It appears to the Court that some of the restrictive covenants at issue may likely have
been abandoned and/or discriminatorily enforced, while others have not Over a year ago, the Court urged the parties
to make a good faith attempt to resolve this matter through settlement It is evident that such an effort was not made.
Given the factual disputes and evidence submitted, the Court again urges the parties to entry into good faith
settlement negotiations to resolve this matter.
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CONCLUSION
The Court DENIES the defendant's renewed motion for summary judgment
Additionally, consistent with the defendant's bankruptcyfiling,the Court shall stay proceedings
in this matter pending the defendant's bankruptcy action The Court directs the plaintiff to
prepare and submit an order that is consistent with and reflects this Ruling.
Date signed: l l 3 \ t f / \

.

:xJf\ (fw^r
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
JONM.MEMMOTT
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that I sent a true and correct copy of the foregoing RULING ON
DEFENDANT'S RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT postage pre-paid,
to the following on this date:

(_

Ua^x

E. Craig Smay
E. Craig Smay, P.C.
174 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
David J. Crapo
Richard J. Armstrong
Wood Crapo LLC
500 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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WOOD JENKINS LLC
Richard J. Armstrong, No. 7461
500 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 366-6060
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°Or

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY

BARTON WOODS HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION, INC., a Utah corporation,

;)

ORDER

\)

Civil No. 070700680

v.

]i

Judge Robert Dale

DENA STEWART, an individual, and JOHN
DOES 1-10,

;

Plaintiff,

Defendants.
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion: (1) to Dismiss
Plaintiff's Complaint and Defendant's Counterclaims Pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 41; or, in the
Alternative, (2) for Summary Judgment on all Claims and Counterclaims, and Defendant's
Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment ("Motions"). Having reviewed the written and oral
arguments in support of and in opposition to the Motions, and being otherwise fully advised on
the matter, the Court hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES as follows:
1.

Plaintiffs Motion: (1) to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint and Defendant's

Counterclaims Pursuant to UtahR. Civ. P. 41; or, in the Alternative, (2) for Summary Judgment
on all Claims and Counterclaims is GRANTED.
2.

Defendant's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3.

This action, including all claims and counterclaims, is dismissed with

prejudice, with each party to bear their own costs and attorney's fees.
DATED this ffV day of December, 2010.
BY THE COURT:

/NU<£/
Honorable Robert Dale
Second District Court
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 7th day of December, 2010. a true and correct
copy of the foregoing proposed ORDER was served via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to the
following:
E. Craig Smay
E. CRAIG SMAY, P.C.
174 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendant and
Counterclaim Plaintiff
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E. Craig Smay #2985
174 E. South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone Number (801) 539-8515
Fax Number (801) 539-8544
Attorney for Defendant
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY
BARTON WOODS HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION, INC., a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,

vs.

NOTICE OF APPEAL
Civil No. 070700680
Judge Robert Dale

DENA STEWART, an individual, and
JOHN DOES 1-10,
Defendants.

Notice is hereby given that Defendant Stewart appeals to the Utah Supreme Court the final
judgment of Honorable Robert Dale entered in this matter December 22,2010. The appeal is
taken from the entire judgment.
Respectfully submitted this 11 th day of January, 2011.

U^A
E. Craig Smay, Attorney for Defendar
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing "NOTICE OF APPEAL",
was sent on the 11th of January, 2011, by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid to the following:

WOOD CRAPO LLC
David J. Crapo
Richard J. Armstrong
500 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 366-6060

E. Craig Smay, Attorney
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ENABLING DECLARATION OF COVENANTS,
CONDITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS OF

511
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BARTON WOODS PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENT

THIS ENABLING DECLARATION OF COVENANTS, CONDITIONS
RESTRICTIONS is made and executed this
/f
day of
199 3,

by Bartonwood Limited Liability Company,

AND

a Utah Lino.ted

Liability Company, hereinafter referred to as "DECLARANT."
R E C I T A L S :
A.

Declarant is the sole owner of that certain parcel of

real property (sometimes referred to herein as the "Declarant's
Property"),"" situated in Davis County, Utah, and more particularly
described as:
i
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Beginning at the Northwest Corner of L o t 61 of
Lakeview Terrace Subdivision in Bountiful City, Davis
County, Utah, which point is N 0 : 04'30"E 393.91 ft. along
t h e Section Line and East- 244.18 ft. from the West
Quarter Corner of Section 28, T.2N., R-.IE., S.L.B.&M. and
running thence along t h e boundary of Lot 62 of said
Lakeview Terrace Subdivision in the following nine
c o u r s e s : Northeasterly 207.33 ft. along t h e arc of a
420.00 ft. radius curve to t h e right through a central
angle of 2B°L6 , 59" (radius point bears S 8 7 ° 2 4 , 5 6 W E from
t h e point of b e g i n n i n g ) , Northeasterly 253.12 ft. along
t h e arc of a 280.00 ft. radius curve to t h e left through
a central angel of 5 1 ° 4 7 ' 4 4 " (radius point bears N
5 9 ° 0 7 , 5 7 W W from the beginning of the c u r v e ) , N 8 2 0 4 4 , 3 3 " E
154.42 ft., N 74°50'01 M E 181.72 ft. f N 77°55 , 11 , , E 292.54
f t . , S 72°14 , 20"E 399.28 f t . , S 0°24 , 05"W 803.99 ft.,
Southwesterly 122.36 ft. along the arc of a 370.88 ft.
radius- curve to the right through a central angle of
18°54'12" (radius point bears N 1 8 ° 4 0 , 4 2 M W from the
beginning of t h e c u r v e ) , Southwesterly 257.69 ft. along
t h e arc of a 1,808.83 ft. radius curve to the left
through a central angle of 8 ° 0 9 , 4 5 H (radius point bears
S 01°13'30 "W from the beginning of t h e curve to the
Southeast Corner of Lakeview Terrace Condominiums Phase
1; thence along the boundary of said Phase i in the
following four courses: N 1°01'30"W 63.00 ft., N
65°58'30 M E 130.27 ft., N ll o 50'50"W 112.56 ft., Westerly
115.15 ft. along t h e arc of a 340.00 ft. radius curve to
the right through a central an^le of 19°24'20" (radius
point bears .N 11°50 , 50 H W. from the beginning of the
Digitized byNthe7°33'30"E
Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J.ft.
Reuben along
Clark Law School,
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54.70
theBYU.
extended
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors. ,
W
boundary of said
Phase 1; thence N 8 7 ° 4 7 3 0 E 64.44
ft.?
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ft.; thence S 87°47'31"W 85.00 ft.; thence N 47°12'3l"W
38.46 ft.; thence S 42°13*30"W 87.00 ft.; thence S
2°12'30ME 25.00 ft.; thence N 87o47'30HE 13.00 ft.;
thence S 2°12'30"E 25.00 ft; thence S 2°11'48,,W 33.37
ft.; thence along the boundary of Lakeview Terrace
Condominiums Phase 1 in the following four courses: S
26°42'30MW 24.00 ft., Northwesterly 122.19 ft. along the
arc of a 300.00 ft. radius curve to the right through a.
central angle of 23°20'10" (radius point bears N
26o42'30"E from the beginning of the curve), S 50°02,40"W>
133.00 ft., S 14°51'10"E 170.04 ft. to the Northeast
Corner of Lot 55 of said Lakeview Terrace Subdivision;
thence N-86°38'38"W 68.72 ft.; N 70°01'46"W 69.11 ft.;
thence N'44°28 '23"W 13.4.94 ft.; thence N 33051'54"W 66.65
ft.; thence N 14o33'09"W 65.87 ft.; thence N 4°42'29"W
67.20 ft.to the Northeast Corner of said Lot 61; thence
N 87024'56MW 130.14 ft. along the North line of said Lot
61 to the Point of Beginning.
^* V-//-7-^JJ
Containing 16.4679 acres.
B.

The Declarant's Property is contiguous to a parcel of

real property, known as Lakeview Terrace Condominiums Phase Nq. 1,
containing various improvements (sometimes referred to herein as
the "Phase I Properties"), more fully described as:
Lakeview Terrace Condominiums Phase No. 1, as the same is
defined and established and identified on the record of
survey map of Lakeview Terrace (Phase 1) duly recorded in
the office of the County Recorder of Davis County, Utahf
on November 11, 1979, as Entry No. 550443, and in the
Enabling Declaration of Lakeview Terrace Condominium
Phase No. 1, dated July 16, 1979, recorded November 11,
1979, as Entry No. 550444, in Book 801, at Page 487, of „
official records"of Davis County, Utah.
Together with an undivided interest in and to the common
areas as the same are established and identified in the
maps and declarations referred to hereinabove.
The real property underlying the Phase 1 Properties has been more
fully described as:
Beginning at the point of reverse curve on the North line
of Lakeview Drive (radius point bears South 13°47'08"
East) said point being South B ? ^ ^ " East 763.50 feet
from the West 1/4 corner of Section. 28, Township 2 North,
Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running
thence easterly along the arc of an 1608.83 foot radius
curve to the:right 177.52 feet; thence North 01°15' West
63.00 feet; thence North 65 0 45 l East 130.27 feet; thence
8232.BA7692.1
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North ^(M^O"'West 112.564 feet along a radial line to
a point on a 340.00 foot rad.\us curve to the right;
thence westerly along the arc of said curve 115.155 feet;
thence North 07°20' East 24.00 feet along a radial line
to a point on a 316.00 foot radius curve to the right;
thence westerly along the arc of said curve 52.12 feet to
the point of tangent with a 276.00 radius curve to the
right (radius bears North 16°47' East); thence westerly
along the arc of said curve 46.726 feet; thence South .
26°29' West 24.00 feet along a radial line to a point on
a 300.00 foot radius curve to the right; thence westerly
along the arc of said curve 122.188 feet; thence South
49°49f10M West 133.00 feet; thence South 15°04%AO" East
170.04 feet; thence South 00°12'44" West 123.07 feet
along the East line of Lot 55, Lakeview Terrace to the
Southeast corner of said Lot 55; thence easterly along
the arc of a 420.00 foot radius curve to the left (radius
point bears North 00°12,44" East) 102.61 feet to the
point of beginning.
C

Declarant's property is also contiguous to a parcel

of real property designated for a clubhouse and related common
amenities (the -Clubhouse Property"), title to which is vested
in Lakeview Terrace Unit Owners Association, a Utah non-profit
corporation, and which property has been more.fully described as:
Beginning at a point South 87°24,5M East 855.26 feet-and
North 5°I6'25" West 317.28 feet from the West quarter
corner, of Section 28, Township 2 North, Range 1 Eas/t,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence North
1°58,15M East 33.37 feet; thence North 2°26' West 25
feet; thence South 87°34' West 13 feet; thence North
2°26' West 25 feet; thence North 42°0r East 87 feet;
thence South•47°26l East 38.46 feet; thence North 87°34'
East 85 feet; thence South 2°26' East 120 feet; thence
South" 87°34' West 64.44 feet; thence South 7°20' West
-30.70 feet to a point on a 316 foot radius curve to the
right (radius point bears North 7°20f East); thence
westerly along the arc of said curve 52.12 feet to the
point of tangency with a 276 foot radius curve to the
right; thence westerly along the arc of said curve 46.726
feet to the point of beginning.
D.

\

Declarant desires to include within the Planned Unit

Development on the Declarant's Property certain improvements and
related common amenities, the locations and specifications of which

8232.BA769Z.1
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are contained i n the O f f i c i a l S u b d i v i s i o n Plat Map for the e n t i r e
Planned Unit Development e s t a b l i s h e d hereby.
E.

Declarant a l s o d e s i r e s ,

subject to terms a c c e p t a b l e

to

Declarant,

t o enter i n t o an agreement or agreements between or

among

owners

the

of

the

Declarant's

Property,

the

Phase

i

P r o p e r t i e s and the Clubhouse Property for common u s e , maintenance,
m.anagement and operation of the Clubhouse Property.
F.

The Declarant d e s i r e s , by recording t h i s D e c l a r a t i o n ,

to

submit a l l of the Declarant's Property, described in Paragraph A
above, t o ' t h e terms of t h i s D e c l a r a t i o n , t o vacate and supersede i n
t h e i r e n t i r e t y a l l prior c o v e n a n t s , conditions and r e s t r i c t i o n s
affecting

the

Declarant's

Properties,

and

to

provide

for

e s t a b l i s h m e n t of an incorporated homeowner's a s s o c i a t i o n t o hold
t i t l e t o , and otherwise t o c o n t r a c t for use of, common p r o p e r t i e s
and improvements

for the b e n e f i t

of

the owners of

the

entire

parcel.
. G.
this

Declarant has obtained t h e acknowledgment and c o n s e n t t o

Declaration

Properties,
liens,

from

all

record

owners

of

the

as well as the consent from a l l p a r t i e s

Declarant's
possessing

i f any, a f f e c t i n g any p o r t i o n of that property which,

by:

t h e i r execution of t h i s Agreement, or t h e i r consents on record w i t h
t h e Davis County Recorder, hereby j o i n i n the submission of

the

D e c l a r a n t ' s Properties t o the terms of t h i s Declaration.
H.

Declarant intends t o provide that the i n d i v i d u a l

lots

l o c a t e d w i t h i n the p r o j e c t , t o g e t h e r with the undivided ownership
i n t e r e s t i n the common areas and f a c i l i t i e s as s p e c i f i e d h e r e i n ,
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shall

hereafter

be

subject

to

the

covenants,
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restrictions,

reservations, assessments, charges and liens herein set forth;
NOW, THEREFORE, Declarant hereby declares that certain parcel
of real property described in Article II, below, shall be held,
sold, conveyed and occupied subject to the following easements,
restrictions, covenants, conditions,

assessments, charges

and

liens, which are for the purposes of protecting the value and
desirability of the subject property and which shall be construed
as covenants of equitable servitude and shall run with the subject
property and be binding on all parties having any rights, title or
interest in that subject property or any part thereof, their heirs,
successors and assigns, and shall inure to the benefit of each
owner thereof.

• . -. *
-ARTICLE I
DEFINITIONS

When used in this Declaration, including the recitals
hereto, the following terms shall have the meaning indicated:
1.1

Association: Barton Woods, Inc., a Utah Non-Prof it .

Corporation, formed for management of the Project .and more fully
described in Article IV, below.
1.2

Declarant:

-

Bartonwood Limited Liability Company,

a Utah limited liability company, and its successors-in-interest
and specific assignees-in-interest to rights and obligations under
this Declaration.
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.1.3

Declaration;

This

t I^T'O

Enabling * Declaration

of

Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions of Barton Woods Planned Unit
Development and all amendments hereto.
1.4

Lot;

Each individual lot within the Project, as

shown on the Map, which lot may or may not be improved and which
may or may not include improvements of the type designated on the
Map and/or authorized by Bountiful City, Utah.
1.5

Management Committee and Committee;

The Board of

Trustees of the Association, or a management committee specifically
designated as such by the Board of Trustees of the Association.
The Committee shall have and exercise the rights, powers and
responsibilities designated and delegated in this Declaration and
in the Articles of Incorporation, * the By-Laws and rules

and

regulations of the Association.
1.6

Manager; The person or entity designated by the

Association to manage the Project.
1.7

Map;

The official subdivision plat map filed and

recorded in the Official Records of the Davis County Recorder.
1.8

Mortgage;

Deed of Trust as well as a mortgage.

1.9

Mortgagee;

Beneficiary or holder under Deed of

Trust as well as a mortgage.
1.10

Owner;

Any person with an ownership interest in a

lot, together with the undivided interest in the common areas as
defined herein.
1.11

Person;

Legal entity as well as natural person.

1.12

Project;

Barton Woods Planned Unit Development.

..
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Subject Property:

P

•* srr •—>

T»

The real property underlying the

P r o j e c t , described in A r t i c l e II below.
ARTICLE I I
GRANT AND SUBMISSION
Declarant
Declaration,

and

hereby
to

the

submits

to

covenants,

the

provisions

conditions,

of

this

restrictions,

reservations, assessment charges and liens hereunder,-that certain
real property (the "Subject Property") situated in Davis County,
Utah, and more fully described as:
Beginning at the Northwest Corner of Lot
'6"i of Lakeview Terrace Subdivision in- Bountiful
City, Davis County,, Utah, which point is N
0°04,30,,E 393.91 ft. along the Section Line and
East 244.18 ft. from the West Quarter Corner of
Section 28, T.2N., R.1E., S.L.B.&M. and running
thence along the boundary of Lot 62 of said
Lakeview Terrace Subdivision in the following
nine courses: Northeasterly 207.33 ft. along the
arc of a 420.00 ft. radius curve to the right
through a central angle of 28°16,59" (radius
point bears S 87°24,56,,E from the point of
beginning), Northeasterly 253.12 ft. along the
arc of a 280.00 ft. radius curve to the left
through a central angel of 51°47,44M (radius
point bears N 59°07'57"W from the beginning of
the curve), N 82°44«33ME
154.42 ft., N
74°50*01ME 181.72 ft., N.77°55'11"E 292.54 ft.,
S 72°14 , 20 H E 399.28 ft., S 0°24,05,,W 803.99 ft.,
Southwesterly 122.36 ft. along the arc of a
370.88 ft. radius curve to the right through- a
central angle of 18054'12" (radius point bears
N 18 o 40 , 42"W from the beginning of the"curve),
Southwesterly 257.69 ft. along the arc of a
1,808.83 ft. radius curve to the left through a
central angle of 8°09,45M (radius point bears S
01 ° 13'30 "W from the beginning of the curve to
the Southeast Corner of Lakeview Terrace
Condominiums Phase 1; thence along the boundary
of said Phase 1 in the following four courses:
N 1°01 , 30 W W 63.00 ft., N 65°58,30"E 130.27 ft.,
N ll°50,50,fW 112.56 ft., Westerly 115.15 ft.
along the arc of a 340.00 ft. radius curve to
the right through a central angle of l g ^ ^ O "
8232.BA7692.1
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(radius point bears N 11°50'50"W from the
beginning of the curve); thence N 7°33'30"E
54.70 ft. along the extended boundary of said
Phase 1; thence N 87°47'30"E 64.44 ft.; thence
N 2°12'30"W 25.09 ft.; thence N 2°12'30"W 94.91
ft.; thence S 87°47,31MW 85.00 ft.; thence N
47°12'31"W 38.46 ft.; thence S 42°13'30"W 87.00
ft.; thence S 2°12,30"E 25.00 ft.; thence N
87°47'30"E 13.00 ft.; thence S 2°12'30ME 25.00
ft; thence S 2°ll'48nW 33.37 ft.; thence along
the boundary of Lakeview Terrace Condominiums
Phase 1 in the following four courses: S
26°42'30"W 24.00 ft., Northwesterly 122.19 ft.
along the arc of a 300.00 ft. radius curve" to
the right through a central angle of 23°20'10"
(radius point bears N 26°42'30"E from the
beginning of the curve), S 50o02'40"W 133.00
ft., S 14°51'10"E 170.04 ft. to the Northeast
Corner of Lot 55 of said Lakeview Terrace
Subdivision; thence N 86°38'38"'W 68.72 ft.; N
70°01'46"W 69.11 ft.; thence N 44°28'23"W 134.94
ft.; thence N 33°51,54"W 66.65 ft.; thence N
14°33,09MW 65.87 ft.; thence N 4°42'29,,W 67.20
ft.to the Northeast Corner of said Lot 61;
thence N 87°24'56"W 130.14 ft. along the North
line of said Lot 61 to the Point of Beginning.
Containing 16.4679 acres.
ARTICLE III
COVENANTS, CONDITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS
The foregoing submission is made upon and under the
following covenants, conditions and restrictions:
3.1

Name; • The Project, as submitted to the provisions

of this Declaration, shall be known as Barton Woods Planned Unit
Development.
3.2

Description of Lots;

The Project consists of

individual lots, each of which may or may not be improved and may
or may not include improvements authorized on the map and/or by the
City of Bountiful, Utah.

The improvements on some or all of the
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lots may consist of single family or one-half (1/2) of a duplex
building with the other one-half (1/2) of the structure being on an
adjoining lot. The exterior of all buildings will be constructed of
brick on the lower part, with the upper part being wood, stucco
and/or such other materials authorized by the Committee.

All

improvements shall be constructed in a style and of materials
architecturally compatible with the other improvements on the
Project*
3.3

Description of Lots. The lots in, their locations,

and approximate dimensions are indicated on the Map.
3.4 ' Common Areas and Facilities. The common areas and
facilities of the Project shall be and are the roads, grass and
lawn

areas,

clubhouse

facilities,

specifically

designated

recreational vehicle and public: parking areas, if any, and any and
all other common areas and facilities designated as such on the
Map, and any other future interests in common areas pursuant to the
terms of this Declaration.
3.5

Lots and Rights to Common Areas" and Facilities

Inseparable;

The percentage of undivided interest in the common

areas and facilities shall not be separated from the lot to
which it appertains and, even though not specifically mentioned in
the

instrument

of undivided

of

transfer

interest

or

conveyance,

and such right

such „ percentage

of exclusive use shall

automatically accompany the transfer and conveyance of the lot
to which they relate.
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3.6

Voting - Common Expense - Ownership in Common

and Facilities:

The percentage of undivided ownership i

common areas and facilities is set ' forth in the attached E^
"A," and shall be used for all purposes including, but not limited
tof voting and sharing of the common expenses in the proportionate
amount equal to the percentage of undivided ownership therein.

The

Association shall be the record owner of all common areas and
facilities.
3.7

Easements and Encroachments: If any portion of the

common areas and facilities or any fences or walls adjacent to a
lot boundary in the Project are partially or totally destroyed, and
then

rebuilt

or

improved,

maintained,

painted,

or

repaired,

encroachments shall be permitted as may be necessary, desirable or
convenient upon the lots, and easements for such encroachments and
for the maintenance of the same shall exist for such period of time
as may be necessary, desirable or convenient.
encroachments

shall

be

permitted

to

In addition,

the Association

or

its

designate upon the lots and the common facilities as may be
necessary, convenient or desirable within the Project for: the
installation, placing, removal, inspection and maintenance

of

utility lines and utility service facilities; for regular repairs
and maintenance of exterior portions of improvement on the lots;
for any emergency or necessary repairs; and for lawn, trees,
shrubbery and yard care or maintenance.

Easements

for such

encroachments shall exist for such period of time as may be
necessary, convenient or desirable.
8232.BA7692.1
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3.8

Amendments; In addition to the amendment procedure

provided by law and elsewhere in.this Declaration, the lot owners
shall have the right to amend this Declaration and/or the Map upon
the approval and consent of two-thirds (2/3) of the undivided
interests in the Project and, until the sale from Declarant of lots
having ownership of at least sixty-seven percent (67%) of the
common areas and facilities, with the written consent of Declarant,
which consents and approvals shall be by duly executed and recorded
instruments.
ARTICLE IV
BARTON WOODS, INC.
4.1

Owners Association:

The administration of the

Project shall be governed by this Declaration and the Articles of
Incorporation and the By-Laws of Barton Woods, Inc., a Utah Nonprofit Corporation.

An owner of a lot shall automatically become

a member of the Association and shall remain a member for the
period of his ownership.
4.2

Association

Management:

The

Association

shall

conduct the general management, operation and maintenance of the
Project and of the common areas and facilities and the enforcement
of

the

provisions, of

Incorporation

and By-Laws

this

Declaration, . the

Articles

of

of the Association, and rules and

regulations adopted thereunder.
4.3

Architectural Control:

The Association, by and

through the Committee, shall be charged and empowered with control
of all construction, improvements, and landscaping on the Project
B232.BA7692.1
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to ensure consistency and compatibility of all improvements and
landscaping on the Project.
ARTICLE V
LIMITATION OF USE OF LOTS AND COMMON AREAS
5.1

Purposes; Every lot within the Project shall be used

for single family residential living purposes, such purposes to be
confined to approved residential buildings within the subject
property, whether such lot contains one-half (1/2) of a structure
or a self-standing residence building. No lots within the Project
shall be occupied or used for commercial or business purposes;
provided, however, that nothing in this paragraph 5.1 shall be
deemed to prevent (a) Declarant or its duly authorized agent from
using any lot owned by Declarant as a sales office, sales model,
property management office or rental office, or (b) any owner, or
the owner's duly authorized agent from renting or leasing the
owner's residential building from time to time, subject to all of
the provision of this Declaration.
5.2

No Obligations; Except for portions of the Project

expressly designated on the map, there shall be no obstructions of
the common areas, and nothing shall be, stored .in the common areas
without the prior consent of the Management Committee.
5.3

Alterations,

Additions

and

Attachments:

No

building, fence, wall, tennis court, hot tub or similar structure,
swimming pool or other structure, satellite dish or receiver, or
outside antenna shall be commenced, erected, altered, placed or
permitted to exist on any portion of the Project, without the prior
written approval of the Management Committee. •, All buildings,
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alterations, improvements, additions and maintenance on the Subject
Property shall be made in a workmanlike manner and shall be
architecturally compatible with the rest of the Project.
5.4

Easements:

In addition to any easements of record

on the Project, the Association shall be entitled to easements on
all lots and other portions of the Project for drainage facilities
and for installation, maintenance, placing, removal, inspection,
painting, repair and improvement of fences, utilities and common
areas and facilities, for necessary or emergency repairs, and for
maintenance and care of lawns, trees, shrubbery up to the edge of
all building constructed in the Project, and such easements shall
exist whether or not they are specified on the recorded Map, and in
accordance with paragraph 3.7 of Article III, above.
5.5

No Animals; No animals, livestock, birds or poultry

of any kind shall be raised, bred, or kept on any lot or in the
common areas, except that dogs, cats and other household pets under
the weight of fifteen- pounds may be kept provided that they are not
kept, bred, or maintained for any commercial purpose and, provided
further, that they do not become an annoyance-or nuisance, for any
reason, to any owner or resident of a lot.
permitted

shall be

strictly controlled

Such animals as ..are

and kept

pursuant to

Bountiful City ordinances and regulations, and the rules and
regulations of the Management Committee.

In addition, the owners

of each animal shall be solely responsible for the clean-up of that
animal's waste and for repair of all damage cause by that animal.

1
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5.6

Ho Offensive Activity:

No noxious or of fen.

activity shall be carried on in any lot or in the common areas,
shall anything be done therein which may be or become an annoyance
or nuisance to the other owners.
5.7

Construction in Common Areas and Lots;

Nothing

shall be altered or constructed in or removed from the common areas
or Lots,

except

upon

the

written

consent

of

the Management

Committee.
5.8

Rules;

The Management Committee is authorized to

adopt rules for the use of the common areas and Lots, which rules
shall be in writing and furnished to the owners.
5.9

Dumping of Garbage:

Except in areas designated on

the map or by the Management Committee, no lot or portion of the
common areas shall be used or maintained as a dumping ground for
rubbish, trash, garbage or other waste, nor shall any rubbish,
trash, papers, junk or debris be burned within the Project.

All

trash, rubbish, garbage or other waste within the boundaries of the
Project shall be kept only in sanitary containers. Each lot shall
be kept free of trash and refuse by the owner of such lot.

No

person shall allow any unsightly, unsafe or dangerous conditions to
exist on or in any lot.
5.10

Excavation;

No excavation for stone, gravel or

earth shall be made on the subject property unless such excavation
is made in connection with the erection of a building, structure,
landscaping or other improvement thereon.
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5.11

Parking of Vehicles:
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No vehicles shall be parked

overnight on any of the streets or roadways in the Project or on
any common areas of the Project, nor on any lot outside of any
enclosed garage, except such vehicles, and upon such portions of
the Project, specifically designated for this purpose on the map or
by the Management Committee,

In addition, no boats, campers,

trailers, large trucks, motor homes, or similar large items shall
be parked or stored on any lot; or in the common areas, except in
accordance with rules and regulations adopted by the Management
Committee".
ARTICLE VI
INSURANCE
6.1

Obtaining of Insurance Policies;

The Management

Committee shall obtain and maintain, at all times,' a policy or
policies insuring the Management Committee, the lot owners and the
Manager against any liability to the public or to the owners of
lots and common areas, and their invitees or tenants, incident to
the ownership and/or use of the common areas of the project, issued
by such insurance companies and with such limits of liability as
determined by the Management Committee.

Each such policy or

policies shall be issued on the comprehensive liability basis, and
shall provide cross-liability endorsement wherein the rights of
named insured under the policy or policies shall not be prejudiced
as in respect to his, her or their action against another named
insured.

4
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Other Insurance;

B1593

In addition , the Management

Committed may obtain insurance for such other risks of a similar or
dissimilar nature as are or shall hereafter customarily be covered
with

respect

to

common

areas

or

other Projects

similar

in

construction, design and use.
ARTICLE VII
COMMON ASSESSMENTS
7.1

Payment of Expenses:

Each lot owner shall pay to

the Management Committee that owner's portion of the costs and
expenses required and deemed necessary, and upon the terms of
payment determined by the Management Committee," in connection with
water, sewer and other utility services and connection fees (if not
directly metered or billed to individual lots) to the Project and
costs and expenses deemed necessary to manage, maintain and operate
the common areas and facilities of the Project, and may include,
among

other

assessments;

things, the
fire,

cost

casualty

of
and

management;
public

taxes;

liability

special

insurance

premiums; the Association's share of costs, if any, incurred
pursuant to Section 7.4 below; common lighting, if any; landscaping
and the :care of grounds, both of common areas and lawns and
shrubbery on individual lots; maintenance, repairs and painting of
the exterior of any structures on the lots; repairs and renovations
of common areas and facilities, recreational areas and facilities,
if

any; snow removal, if any; wages and charges; legal

and

accounting fees; water and sewer charges not separately metered or
charged to lots; cost of operating all gas-fired equipment and the
. 8232.BA7692.1
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cost .of electricity; expenses and liabilities incurred by the
Management Committee under or by reason of this Declaration, the
Articles of Incorporation or By-Laws of the Association;

the

payment of any deficit remaining from a previous period; and the
creation of a reasonable contingency or other reserve or surplus
relating to this Project.

Such payments shall be made upon the

terms, at the time, and in the manner provided without deduction of
any off-sets or claims which the owner may have against

the

Committee, and if any owner shall fail to pay any installment
within one (1) month from the time when the same becomes due, the
owner shall pay interest thereon *at the rate of one and one-half
percent (1-1/2%) per month from the date when such installment
shall become due to the date of the payment thereof, and all costs
and expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees, incurred by the
Management Committee in collecting such unpaid assessments, whether
or not formal legal proceedings have been commenced.
7.2

Collection of Assessments: The Management Committee

may, from time to time, up to the close of the year for which such
cash requirements have been so fixed or determined, increase or
diminish "the amount previously fixed or determined for such year.
The assessment may include a pro-rata reallocation among the. lots
of any unpaid assessments on a lot which are not assessable against
a lot owner, subject to the provisions of Article IX, below.

The

Committee may include in the cash requirements, for any year, any
liabilities or items of expense which accrued or became payable in
the previous year or which might have been included in the cash
8232-BA7692.1
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requirementsf for a previous year, but were not included thereinf
arid also any sums which the Management Committee may deem necessary
or prudent to provide a reserve against liabilities or expenses
then accrued or thereafter to accrue although not payable in that
year.

In any year in which there is an excess of assessments

received over' amounts actually used for the purposes described in
this Declaration such excess may, upon written consent of all
members, be applied against and reduce the subsequent year's
assessment or be refunded to the members.

The preceding sentence

shall automatically be repealed upon the revocation of Revenue
Ruling 70-604, 19 70-2,
Service or upon

CB 9 promulgated by the Internal Revenue

a court

of competent

appellate

jurisdiction

declaring such Revenue Ruling invalid or upon amendment of the
Internal Revenue

Code or the Treasury Regulations

thereunder

obviating the requirement of a membership vote to apply such excess
to the subsequent year's assessments or to refund the same in order
that such excess be excluded from gross income of the Association.
Notwithstanding

any

other

provision

herein

to

contrary, assessments and any other charges shall include

the
an

adequate reserve fund for maintenance, repairs and replacement of
those elements of the common areas and facilities that must be
replaced

on

a

periodic

basis

and

are

payable

in

regular

installments rather than by special assessments.
7.3

Determination of Amounts; The pro-rata portion

payable by the owner in and for each year or portion of year shall
be the ratio, a sum within limits and on conditions hereinabove
8232.8A7692.1
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provided, calculated by multiplying the aggregate amount of
cash requirements for such year, or portion of year, by the ov
percentage

of

facilities-

undivided

interest

in

the

common

areas

and

All such assessments, together with the additional

sums accruing under this Declaration, shall be payable monthly in
advance, or in such payments and installments as shall be required
by the Management Committee, and at such times as shall.be provided
by the Management Committee.
7.4
shall,

if

Contracts for Use of Common Areas; The Association

the

Management

Committee

in

its

sole

discretion

determines, have the right to enter into an agreement or agreements
with the owner or owners of the Phase I properties and/or the
Clubhouse Property (as defined in the Recitals to this Agreement)
for the Association's participation in or sharing of common areas
and

facilities

properties.

between

or

among

the

owners

of

the

various

The provisions of any such agreement, and the term

thereof, shall be upon such conditions, provisions and terms as the
Management Committee in its sole discretion determines.

Such

agreements may provide for the Association to pay its proportionate
share of all costs and expenses of such other common areas and
facilities, which cost shall be an expense to the Association under
Section 7.1 above.
7.5

Unimproved Lots:

It is the express intention of

this Declaration, and this Declaration shall be so construed, that
the entire pro-rata assessments payable to the Management Committee
herein shall be made only to the extent so as to allow occupancy of
823Z.BA769E.1
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Accordingly, notwithstanding any other provisions of

this Declaration, the Management Committee shall have discretionary
powers to assess amounts less than the entire pro-rata assessments,
or no assessments, specified above with respect to any lot on which
habitable improvements have not been completed on such lot.
7.G
Committee

Powers of Management Committee;

The Management

shall have discretionary powers to provide in this

Declaration and in the Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws of the
Association, to prescribe the manner of maintaining the operation
of the Project, and to determine the cash requirements of the
Management Committee to be paid as aforesaid by the owners under
this Declaration.

Every such reasonable determination by the

Committee within the bounds of this Declaration shall be final and
conclusive as to the owners, and any expenditures made by the
Committee within the bounds of this Declaration shall be deemed, as
against the owners, necessary and properly made for such purpose.
7.7

Application of Lease Payments; If any owner shall,

at any time, let or sublet any lot and shall default for a period
of one' (1) month in payment of any management assessments, the
Management Committee may, at its option, so long as such default
shall continue, demand and receive from any tenant or subtenant of
such owner occupying the lot, the rent due or becoming due up to
the amount of such assessment payable, together with all penalties
provided herein.

Such payment of rent to the Committee shall be

sufficient payment and discharge of such tenant or subtenant as

8232.BA7692.1
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between such tenant or subtenant and such owner to the extent of
the amount so "paid.
7.8
and

Collection of Assessments: Each monthly assessment

each special

assessment

shall

be separate, distinct

and

personal debts and obligations of the owner against whom the same
are assessed at the time the assessment is made, and shall be
collectible as such.

Suit to recover money judgment for unpaid

common expenses may be maintained without foreclosing or waiving
the lien securing the same.

The amount of assessment, whether

regular or special, assessed to the owner of any lot plus interest
at one and one-half percent (1-1/2%) per month and the costs,
including reasonable attorneys fees, shall become a lien upon such
lot upon recordation of notice of assessment.

Said lien for non-

payment of common expenses shall have priority over all other liens
and encumbrances, recorded or unrecorded, except only:
(a)

Tax and special assessment liens on the lot in

favor of any assessment authority, or special district;
and
(b)

Encumbrances

on

the

owner's

lot

and

such

owner's interest in the common areas recorded prior to
the date such notice is recorded which by law would be a.
lien prior to subsequently recorded encumbrances,
A certificate executed and acknowledged by a majority of
the Management Committee stating the indebtedness secured by the
lien upon any lot in the Project hereunder shall be conclusive upon
the Management Committee and the owners as to the amount of such

8232.BA7692.1
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indebtedness on the date of the certificate, in favor of all
persons who rely thereon in good faith, and such certificate shall
be furnished to any owner or any encumbrancer or prospective
encumbrancer of a lot upon request at a reasonable fee, not to
exceed Ten Dollars ($10.00). Unless the request for a certificate
of indebtedness shall be complied with within ten (10) days, all
unpaid common expenses which become due prior to the date of the
making of such request shall be subordinate to the lien held by the
person making the request. Any encumbrancer holding a lien on the
lot may pay any unpaid common expenses payable with respect to such
lot and upon such payment such encumbrancer shall have a lien on
such lot for the amounts paid of the same ranks as the lien of his
encumbrance.
Upon payment of a delinquent assessment concerning which
such a certificate has been so recorded, or other satisfaction
thereof the Management Committee shall cause to be recorded, in the
same

manner

as

the

certificate

of

indebtedness,

a

further

certificate stating the satisfaction and the release of the lien
thereof.

Such lien for non-payment of assessment may be enforced

by sale by the Management Committee or by a bank or trust company
or title insurance company authorized by the Management.Committee,
such sale to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of law
applicable to the exercise of powers of sale or foreclosure in
deeds of trust or mortgages or in any manner permitted by law.

In

any foreclosure of sale, the owner shall be required to pay the

8232.BA7692.1
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costs and expenses of such proceedings and reasonable attorney's
fees.
In case of foreclosure, the owner shall be required to pay
a reasonable rental for the lot from the date the foreclosure
action is filed with the Court having jurisdiction over the matter,
and the Plaintiff in the foreclosure action shall be entitled to
the appointment of a receiver, at the time such action is filed, to
collect th"e rental without regard to the value of the mortgaged
security.

In any foreclosure or sale, the owner shall also be

required to pay the costs and expenses of such proceedings and
reasonable 'attorney's fees.

The Management Committee or Manager

shall have the power to bid on the lot. at foreclosure or other sale
and to hold, lease, mortgage and convey the lot.
ARTICLE VIII
MORTGAGE PROTECTION
Notwithstanding

all

other

provisions

herein

to

the

.m-

contrary:
8.1

Rights of First Refusal;

Any

"right of first

refusal" which may be granted herein shall not impair the rights of
the first mortgagee of a lot to:
(a)

. •_ .

Foreclose or take -title to a lot pursuant to

the remedies provided in. the mortgage, or
(b) Accept a deed

(or assignment) in lieu of

foreclosure in the event of default by a mortgagor, or
(c)

To

sell

or

lease

a

lot

acquired

mortgagee.
"

8232.BA7692.1
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Title in Mortgagee: Any first mortgagee who obtains

title to a lot pursuant to the remedies provided in the mortgage or
foreclosure of the mortgage will not be liable for such

lot's

unpaid dues or charges which accrue prior to the acquisition of
title of such lot by the mortgagee.
8.3

Consent of Mortgagees: Unless at least two-thirds

(2/3) of the first mortgagees (based .upon one vote for each first
mortgage owned) or owners (other than the sponsor, developer or
builder) of the individual lots in the Project have given their
prior written approval, the Association or any corporation or trust
established by the Association shall not be entitled to:
(a)

By

partition,

act

or

subdivide,

omission,
encumber,

seek

to

abandon,

sell or transfer

any

common areas or facilities owned, directly or indirectly,
by

the

Association

or

any

corporation

or

trust

established by the Association, for the benefit of the
lots in the Project (the granting of easements for public
utilities or for other public purposes consistent with
the intended use of such common areas and facilities by
the Project shall not .be deamed a transfer within the
meaning of this clause)-;
(b)

Change

the

method

of

determining

the

obligations^ assessments, dues or other charges which may
be levied against a lot owner;
(c)
any
8232.BA7692.1
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pertaining to the architectural design or the exterior
appearance of lots, the exterior maintenance of lots, the
maintenance of any common property party walls or common
fences or driveways, or the upkeep of lawns and plantings
in the Project;
(d)
insurable

Fail to maintain fire and extended coverage on
common

areas

and

facilities_ on

a

current

replacement cost basis in an amount not less than one
hundred percent (100%) of the insurable value (based on
current replacement cost),
(e)

Use hazard insurance proceeds for losses to

any common areas and facilities other than the repair,
replacement or reconstruction of such common areas and
facilities•
8.4

Taxes and Expenses:

First mortgagees of lots may,

jointly or singly, pay taxes or other charges which are in default
and which may or have become a charge against any common areas and
facilities

and may

pay overdue

premiums

on

hazard

insurance

policies, or secure new hazard insurance coverage on the lapse of
a

policy,

mortgagees

for

such- common

making

such

areas

payments

and

facilities,

shall

-be

owed

and

first

immediate

reimbursement therefor from the Association.
8.5

Notice of Default bv Individual Lot Borrower:

A

first mortgagee of a lot, upon request, shall be entitled

to

written notification from the Association of any default in the
performance by the individual lot borrower of any obligation under
%
8232.BA7692.1
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this Declaration, or other constituent documents of this Planned
Unit Development, which is not cured within sixty (60) days.
8.6

Management

Agreements;

Any

agreement

for

professional management of the Project, or any other contract
providing for services of the developer, sponsor or builder, may
not exceed three (3) years.

Any such agreement must provide for

termination by either party without cause and without payment of a
termination fee oh ninety (90) days or less written notice.
8.7

Mo Priority:

No- provision herein is intended, nor

shall it be construed, to give any lot owner, or any other party,
priority over any rights of the first mortgagee of a lot pursuant
to its mortgage in the case of a distribution to such lot owner of
insurance proceeds or condemnation awards for losses to or a taking
of common areas and facilities.
ARTICLE IX
VACATING PRIOR COVENANTS
AND RESTRICTIONS
The Declarant, and all other owners of, and lien holders
on, any and all portions of the Subject Property, conclusively and
irrevocably agree that all prior recorded covenants, conditions,
restrictions and declarations of every nature are. vacated

and

terminated in their entirety and are superseded in their entirety
by the provisions of this Declaration, including, but not limited
to:
a. . The Enabling Declaration of Lakeview Terrace
Condominiums Phase No. 1, dated July 16, 1979, together
8232.BA7692.1
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with the attached bylaws, recorded November 14, 1979 , as
Entry

No.

55044,

in

Book

801,

at

pages

487-522,

inclusive, of the records of the Davis County Recorder.
b.

The

First

Amendment

to

the

Enabling

Declaration and Bylaws of Lakeview Terrace Condominiums,
" dated October 1, 1987, and recorded October 1, 1987, as
Entry No. 0803513, in Book 1196r at pages 1113-1133,
inclusive, of the records of the Davis County Recorder.
c.

The Record of Survey Map of Lakeview Terrace

(Phase 1) recorded in the office of the County Recorder
of Davis County, Utah, on November 11, 1979, as Entry No.
550443.
d.

Restrictive Covenants, dated December 4, 1974,

and recorded December 4, 1974, as Entry No. 405948, in
Book 556, at Page 86, et. seq., in the records of the
Davis County Recorder.
e.
1976,

Restrictive

Covenants, dated

February

18,

and recorded March 8, 1976, as entry No. 429197, in

Book 593, at Page 881, et. seq., in the records of the
Davis County Recorder.
f.
1976,

Declaration of Restrictions, dated June 15,

and recorded June 16, 1976, as Entry No. 436079, in

Book 605, at pages 430, et. seq. in the records of the
Davis County Recorder.
g.
1979,

Revised Restrictive Covenants, dated June 28,

and recorded October 2, 1979, in Book 795, at Pages
\

*

8232.BA7692.1
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et

seq. , in

the

records of

the

Davis

County

Recorder.
ARTICLE X
* MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
10.1

Interpretation: The provisions of this Declaration

shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose of creating
a uniform plan for the development and operation of a planned unit
development.

Failure to enforce any provision hereof shall not

constitute a waiver of the rights to enforce said provision or any
other provision hereof.
10.2

Severability: The provisions hereof shall be deemed

independent and severable, and the invalidity or partial invalidity
or unenforceability of any one provision or portion thereof shall
not effect the validity or enforceability of any other provision
hereof.
10.3

Counterparts;

This Declaration may be executed

simultaneously in any number .of counterparts, each of which shall
be deemed an original, but all of which together shall constitute
one and the same instrument.
10.4 Governing Law and Jurisdiction; Interpretation and
enforcement of this Declaration shall be according to the laws of
Utah.

Jurisdiction and venue of any dispute hereunder shall be in

Davis County, Utah, or in the United States District Court for
Utah.
10.5

Default;

If any party governed by the terms of this

Declaration defaults under any provision hereof, that defaulting
8232.BA7692.1
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party shall pay all costs and attorneys' fees incurred by any other
party to enforce the provisions hereof, whether incurred through
formal lawsuit or otherwise.
10.6

Paragraph Numbers

and Headings:

Headings

and

paragraph numbers have been inserted herein solely for convenience
and reference and shall not be construed to affect the meanings,
construction or effect hereof.
1*0.7

Effective Date; This Declaration shall take effect

upon recording.
DECLARANT:
BARTONWOOD LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY
A U t a h L i m i t e d L i a b i l i t y Company
£
fy^x
B CXMrvuJa.
I t s : ^-fc-XJs-i ss.j?_A

-J
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
On the

ss.

I&4) of

^J'utsiL'lu.

. 1993, A.D., personally

appeared before me Lynda Hobson, who being duly sworn, did say that
she is the Manager of Bartonwood Limited Liability Company, and
that the within and foregoing instrument was signed in behalf of
said limited liability company by authority of its governing
documejvfcs^^n^of^its jmembers.
i x&stiSK
• &&T$k
f fV/SSssKw

Notary Pubfle
!
SANDRAKKEATON I
261 EttOOO Swift Suite «2001
1

vlwl/
^ k ^ f f i ^88
NNgw, ^gSgTi^*

I Xjg^-

StotDolUfch

Wand-i*:, /f &*fcn
NOTARY PUBLIC
R e s i d i n g a t : SriC?'?f/lA'

j

My Commission E x p i r e s : ^
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EXHIBIT "A"
TO THE ENABLING DECLARATION OF COVENANTS,
CONDITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS OF
BARTON WOODS PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENT
The Planned Unit Development consists of sixty (60) lots.
Improvements on a portion of the lots may consist of single family,
detached residential structures; and improvements on the remaining
lots may consist of duplex buildings with each such building being
situated on two adjoining lots.
Each lot, regardless of the nature of the improvements
thereon, shall be entitled to ownership of one-sixtieth (l/60th)
undivided interest in the common areas and facilities of the
Project; and each Lot shall be responsible for and subject to onesixtieth (l/G0th) of the total assessments by the Association for
the Project. One-sixtieth of thq interests herein equals one and
two-thirds"percent (1 2/3%).

8232.BA7692.1
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JARES ASHAUERT DAVIS CKTY RECORDER
CERTIFICATE OF AMENDMENT
jff^tim
DECLARATION
OF PROTECTIVE COVENANTS, CONDITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS
. - ~ A 1 D F BARTON WOODS PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENT

i^H- ?fQ i f h f ^ ^ s i a ,
I&&" o 4 o \ t h r u
Ci^i£
^
Pursuant to Section ?.8 or the Enabling Declaration of Protective Covenants,
Conditions and Restrictions of Barton Woods Plannpd Unit Development recorded with the
Davis County Recorder on March 24, 1993 as Entry No. 1024393 in Book No. 1593 at
pages 59 to 88, (the "First Declaration"), an election of the Members of Barton Woods, Inc.
(the "Association") was called to consider the amendments to the First Declaration reflected
in this Certificate. At such election, more than two-thirds (2/3) of the votes entitled to be
cast by the Members were cast in favor of amending the First Declaration as set forth in this
Certificate. Accordingly, the First Declaration is hereby amended to read as follows:
Paragraph 1.1 is rewritten in its entirety to read as follows:
1.1
Association: Barton Woods Homeowners Association, Inc., a Utah
non-profit corporation, formed for management of the Project and more fully described in
Article IV, below.
Paragraph 1.6 is rewritten in its entirety to read as follows:
1.6
Manager: The Board of Trustees of the Association or such person or
entity designated by the Board of Trustees to manage the Project.
Paragraph 4.1 is rewritten in its entirety to read as follows:
4.1
Owners Association: The Project shall be administered by a Utah Nonprofit Corporation named Barton Woods Homeowners Association, Inc. An owner of a Lot
shall automatically become a member of the Association and shall remain a member for the
period of his or her ownership.
Paragraph 4.3 is rewritten in its entirety to read as follows:
4.3
Design Review Committee: The purposes of the Design Review
Committee (the "Committee") shall be to create, maintain and improve Barton Woods
Planned Unit Development as a pleasant and desirable environment, to establish and preserve
a harmonious design for the community and to protect and promote the value of the
Property, exterior design, landscaping and changes or alterations to the existing use of the
Property.
Paragraph 4.4 is added to the Declaration and shall read in its entirety as
follows:
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4.4
Creation of Design Review Cnmmine^: The Committee will consist of
at least three members but may have as many members as may be appointed by the Board
firom time to time in accordance with the Association's Bylaws. Any Member who owns five
or more Lots in the Project shall be appointed as a member of the Committee. The regular
term of office for each Committee member shall be one year, coinciding with the fiscal year
of the Association. Any such Committee member may be removed with or without cause by
the Board at any time by written notice to such appointee. A successor or successors
appointed to fill such vacancy shall serve the remainder of the term of the former member.
Paragraph 4.5 is added to the Declaration and shall read in its entirety as
follows:
4.5
Powers of Design Review Committee: The Committee is hereby
authorized to perform the design review functions prescribed in this Declaration and the
Association's Bylaws and to cany out the provisions set forth therein. The Committee is
authorized to retain the services of one or more consulting architects, landscape architects or
urban designers, who need not be licensed to practice in the State of Utah, to advise and
assist the Committee in performing its duties.
At its option, the Committee may require that the Lot owner submitting plans
for review pay a $100 design review fee to the Board before any home and landscape plans
shall be reviewed or approved by the Committee. The $100 fee will be used by the Board to
pay the costs of architects an other professionals retained by the Committee to review home
plans. Lot owners are encouraged to submit preliminary-schematic drawings to the
Committee as soon as possible in order to avoid unnecessary revisions and delay in
construction.
The Committee may reject any home and landscape plans it deems do not
comply with the provisions of this Declaration. The decision of the Committee may be
reviewed by the Board on appeal by the owner or at the Board's own discretion. No
construction may begin on any Lot until the Committee has approved the home and landscape
plans.
Paragraph 4.6 is added to the Declaration and shall read in its entirety as
follows:
4.6
Security Deposit: The Committee shall not approve any home and
landscape plans until the owner or the owner's Contractor delivers a cashier's check in the
amount of $2,500 to the Committee to serve as a Security Deposit. This Security Deposit
shall be placed in the Association's checking account and may be used by the Committee, in
its discretion, to cure any damage to parkstrips, sprinkler lines, pipes, sidewalks, roads, Lots
or any other Common Areas that may occur as a result of the Contractor's construction of
the owner's improvements. If the Committee determines that any damage to parkstrips,
sprinkler lines, pipes, sidewalks, roads, Lots or any other Common Areas has occurred as a
result of the construction, whether by the Contractor, a subcontractor, the owner, visitor, or

2
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other individual, the Committee shall make a finding to such effect, specifying the particular
condition or conditions which exist, and pursuant thereto give notice thereof to the owner and
the Contractor that unless corrective action is taken within fourteen days, the Committee may
cause such action to be taken and pay for such action with monies from the Security Deposit.
If the Security Deposit is insufficient to cure any damage, both the owner and the Contractor
may be billed for the balance due. The Committee is authorized and empowered to cause an
action to be taken for collection of any balance due under this paragraph and the costs
thereof shall be assessed against such owner and his or her Lot as a Maintenance Charge and
shall be secured by the Assessment Lien. Any portion of the Security Deposit that is not
used to cure any damages, shall be returned to the owner or the owner's Contractor upon
completion of the construction of the owner's improvements.
Paragraph 4.7 is added to the Declaration and shall read in its entirety as
follows:
Enforcement. If an owner's construction deviates from his or her approved
plans, the Committee may require that the owner comply with the approved plans. If the
Committee determines that any construction does not comply with the approved plans, the
Committee shall so notify the owner and require that corrective action be taken within
fourteen days. If at the expiration of said fourteen-day period of time the requisite corrective
action has not been taken, the Board shall be authorized and empowered to cause such action
to be taken and the cost and legal fees thereof shall be assessed against such owner and his
or her Lot as a Maintenance Charge and shall be secured by the Assessment Lien.
Paragraphs 5.3 and 5.7 are amended by substituting the words "Design Review
Committee" for the words "Management Committee."
Paragraph 7.5 is rewritten in its entirety to read as follows:
7.5
Unimproved T^ots: As of the date of this Certificate of Amendment, all
unimproved Lots, except those currently owned by O.C. Oaks, LLC, shall be assessed the
monthly operating and maintenance assessments payable under this Declaration just as are the
Lots that have improvements on them. Unimproved Lots owned by O.C. Oaks, LLC shall
be assessed the monthly operating and maintenance assessments payable under this
Declaration at the earlier of (1) the date an improvement is completed on the Lot or (2) one
year from the date a Lot currently owned by O.C. Oaks, LLC is sold to an individual who
owns 5 or fewer Lots in the Development. Special assessments for such things as capital
improvements may be imposed on all improved and unimproved Lots if the consent of twothirds (2/3) of the Members is obtained.
A new Paragraph 7.9 is added to the Declaration and shall read in its entirety
as follows:
7.9
Combination of Lots: Lots 301 and 302 shall be treated as one Lot for
building, voting, and assessment purposes and shall be designated as "Lot 301." Lots 409

3
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and 410 shall be treated as one Lot for building, voting and assessment purposes and shall be
designated as "Lot 410." Lots 507 and 508 shall be treated as one Lot for building, voting,
and assessment purposes and shall be designated as "Lot 507." If Bountiful City requires
that two Lots be joined as one Lot in order for a building permit to be issued, the Owner
may ask the Board to treat the two Lots as one Lot for assessment purposes, and such
request may be granted at the discretion of the Board. If two Lots are joined by an Owner to
form one Lot upon which one improvement is constructed, the assessments assessed against
the combined Lots shall be seventy-five percent (75 %) of the total of the assessments that
would have been made against die Lots had they remained as two separate Lots. If three
Lots are joined by Owners to form two Lots upon which one improvement is constructed
upon each of the two Lots, the assessments assessed against each Lot shall be seventy-five
percent (75%) of the total assessment that would have been levied against one and one-half
Lots.
Exhibit A is hereby amended in its entirety to read as follows:
Exhibit A
Percentage of Undivided Ownership in Common Areas
.

Lot Number
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
301
303
304

Percentage of Ownership
1.75438%
1.75438%
1.75438%
1.75438%
1.75438%
1.75438%
1.75438%
1.75438%
1.75438%
1.75438%
1.75438%
1.75438%
1.75438%
1.75438%
1.75438%
1.75438%
1.75438%
1.75438%
1.75438%
1.75438%
1.75438%
1.75438%
1.75438%
1.75438%

•
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Percentage of Ownership

Lot Number

Totals

306
307
308
309
310
311
312
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412
413
414
415
501
502
503
504
505
506
507
509
510
511
512

1.75438%
1.75438%
1.75438%
1.75438%
1.75438%
1.75438%
1.75438%
1.75438%
1.75438%
1.75438%
1.75438%
1.75438%
1.75438%
1.75438%
1.75438%
1.75438%
1.75438%
1.75438%
1.75438%
1.75438%
1.75438%
1.75438%
1.75438%
1.75438%
1.75438%
1.75438%
1.75438%
1.75438%
1.75438%
1.75438%
1.75438%
1.75438%
1.75438%

57

100%

A new Paragraph 7.10 is added to the Declaration and shall read in its entirety
as follows:
7.10 Withdrawal of Lots. As of the date of this Certificate of Amendment,
O.C. Oaks, LLC owns Lots 101, 112, 113 and 301. O.C. Oaks, LLC may elect to
5
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withdraw any one or all of these Lots from the Barton Woods Planned Unit Development and
its Protective Covenants provided it makes the withdrawal election prior to the time it
transfers ownership of any of these Lots to another person of entity and records a Notice of
Withdrawal with the Davis County Recorder, signed by the President of Barton Woods
Homeowners Association, Inc., prior to the time.it transfers ownership of the particular Lot
to another person or entity.
BARTON WOODS HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION, INC.

Signed By:

(W///Mjrt&/t^
fonn Marshall, President

Attested By:
Secretary
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STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

: ss

E1317752 B212QP

)

.
." _ The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this / 7 % y of
sPMtJy
> 1997 by Ronn Marshall and T.J. Green who acknowledged to me that they
7
are the President and Secretary, respectively, of Barton Woods Homeowners Association,
Inc.

4.

Witness my hand and official seal.
S
E
A
L

Notary Public
KRISTIS. BLACK

"1
,

1259 South 325 East
Bountiful. Utah 84010
My Commission Expires
January 1,2001

I
.
|

state^ooitah^ j | Notary Public

LAop }

My commission expires:

do:\DJCD\CCRAMEND.BAR
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WOOD CRAPO LLC
David J. Crapo, No. 5055
Richard J. Armstrong, No. 7461
500 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 366-6060
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY

BARTON WOODS HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION, INC., a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,

'

]
]>
I
)

DECLARATION OF KEITH
JONES

v.
DENA STEWART, an individual, and JOHN
DOES 1-10,

)
;
;)

Civil No. 070700680
Judge John M. Memmott

Defendants.
KEITH JONES, declares as follows:
1.

I am over 21 years of age, have personal knowledge of the facts

averred to herein, and am otherwise competent to testify to the matters asserted herein.
2.

I currently reside at 941 South Fremont Road, Bountiful, Utah 84010,

which is located in the Barton Woods Planned Unit Development ("BWPUD").
3.

I am currently a member of the Barton Woods Homeowners' Association

("B WHOA") Design Review Committee ("DRC").
4.

As a member of the B WHO A DRC, I am familiar with the original and

amended covenants, conditions, and restrictions ("CC&Rs") applicable to owners within the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Barton Woods Planned Unit Development ("BWPUD").
5.

In particular, I am familiar with paragraph 4.3 of the amended CC&Rs and

its provision governing the DRC, as well as with provisions in the original CC&Rs governing the
exterior of buildings within the BWPUD.
6.

I have reviewed the Affidavit of Shaun Shepherd dated January 22,2009

and Exhibits 1 and 3 of that affidavit, including the bullet points that list purported irregularities
with the properties pictured.
7.

I am familiar with Lots 101 and 102 identified in Mr. Shepherd's

Affidavit. These properties are compliant with the CC&Rs and do not show that the DRC has
abandoned the CC&Rs.
8.

I am familiar with Lot 103. This property does not have an irregular front

door and does not have irregular lights. This property also does not have exterior shutters.
Moreover, this property is consistent with the CC&Rs in design and architecture. Indeed, this
property does not show that the DRC has abandoned the CC&Rs.
9.

I am familiar with Lot 104. This property does not have an irregular front

door, or irregular lights. This property also does not have exterior shutters. Moreover, this
property is consistent with the CC&Rs in design and architecture.
10.

I am familiar with Lots 105 and 106. This property does not have an

irregular front door, and the property is otherwise consistent with the CC&Rs in design and
architecture.
11.

I am familiar with Lot 107. This property does not have dark trim around

the windows and roof line. This property does not have an irregular front door or an irregular
mailbox. Moreover, this property is consistent with the CC&Rs in design and architecture.
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12.

I am familiar with Lot 108. This property does not have an irregular front

door or an irregular mailbox. This property does not have a hot tub. Attached hereto as Exhibit
1 are two photographs of the back of the home on Lot 108. Thefirstphotograph shows a striped
cover, and the second photograph shows an uncovered patio table and chairs. See Ex. 1.
Moreover, this property is consistent with the CC&Rs in design and architecture.
13.

I am familiar with Lot 109. This property does not have an irregular front

door. However, this property has a dark brown garage door, dark exterior shutters, dark stone or
rock above thefrontentrance and the garage, and a brown mailbox. The dark stone above the
garage door andfrontentrance is completely different from the brick that covers the other
portions of the home's exterior. There are no properties in the BWHOA that have these features.
From my standpoint as a member of the DRC, this property violates the CC&Rs because of these
features, and because the owner never obtained approvalfromthe DRC prior to making these
changes to the property.
14.

I am familiar with Lots 110 and 111. This property does not have an

irregular front door. Moreover, this property is consistent with the CC&Rs in design and
architecture.
15.

I am familiar with Lot 201. This is a vacant lot next to Dena Stewart's

property. I am unaware of any CC&Rs that this lot is violating or has violated.
16.

I am familiar with Lot 202. This property does not have an irregular front

door, an irregular mailbox, or irregular lights. Moreover, this property is consistent with the
CC&Rs in design and architecture.
17.

I am familiar with Lot 203. This property does not have an irregular front

door, or an irregular mailbox. Moreover, this property is consistent with the CC&Rs in design
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and architecture.
18.

I am familiar with Lot 204. This property does not have an irregular light

or an irregular mailbox. Moreover, this property is consistent with the CC&Rs in design and
architecture.
19.

I am familiar with Lot 205. This home does not have an irregular front

door or irregular lights. Moreover, this property is consistent with the CC&Rs in design and
architecture.
20.

I am familiar with Lot 206. This home does not have irregular lights and

does not have irregular protruding trim and design. The darkfrontdoor is not inconsistent with
the demands of the association or the design review committee, as the association has not
complained about Defendant's dark front door. Lot 206 is consistent with the CC&Rs in design
and architecture.
21.

I am familiar with Lot 208. This home does not have an irregular mailbox

or irregular lights. Moreover, this property is consistent with the CC&Rs in design and
architecture.
22.

I am familiar with Lot 301. This property does not have irregular two tone

brick colors, does not have protruding trim around the windows and roof lines. This property
does not have irregular lights or an irregular mailbox. Moreover, this property is consistent with
the CC&Rs in design and architecture.
23.

I am familiar with Lot 302. This property does not have an irregular front

door. The Association has not complained about Defendant's darkfrontdoor. The black
mailbox on Lot 302 was approved by the DRC because the owner reported that her white
mailbox had been wrecked by motor vehicles on two separate occasions during the winter
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months when snow covered the ground. The owner felt that the white mailbox was camouflaged
in the snow and that installing a black mailbox would prevent further accidents. This property
does not have irregular lights. Moreover, this property is consistent with the CC&Rs in design
and architecture.
24.

I am familiar with Lot 303. The brown mailbox on this property was

approved by the DRC because the owner reported that the white mailbox had been wrecked by a
motor vehicle on one occasion during the winter months when snow covered the ground. The
owner felt that the white mailbox was camouflaged in the snow and that installing a brown
mailbox would prevent further accidents. This property does not have exterior shutters, and does
not have irregular lights. Moreover, this property is consistent with the CC&Rs in design and
architecture.
25.

I am familiar with Lot 304. This property does not have an irregular front

door or irregular lights. The hot tub in the back yard was approved by the DRC prior to its
installation by the owner. Moreover, this property is consistent with the CC&Rs in design and
architecture.
26.

I am familiar with Lot 305. This property does not have an irregular front

door, or irregular lights. Moreover, this property is consistent with the CC&Rs in design and
architecture.
27.

I am familiar with Lot 306. This property does not have an irregular

mailbox, an irregularfrontdoor, or irregular lights. Moreover, this property is consistent with
the CC&Rs in design and architecture.
28.

I am familiar with Lot 307. This property does not have an irregular brick

design, an irregular mailbox, or irregular lights. Moreover, this property is consistent with the
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CC&Rs in design and architecture.
29.

I am familiar with Lot 308. This property does not have irregular fencing

or irregular lights. This property also does not have exterior shutters. Moreover, this property is
consistent with the CC&Rs in design and architecture.
30.

I am familiar with Lot 309. This property does not have irregular lights, or

an irregular mailbox, or an irregularfrontdoor. Moreover, this property is consistent with the
CC&Rs in design and architecture.
31.

I am familiar with Lot 310. This property does not have an irregular

design above the garage, does not have irregular lights, and does not have an irregular front door.
Moreover, this property is consistent with the CC&Rs in design and architecture.
32.

I am familiar with Lot 311. This property does not have an irregular door,

or irregular rod iron handrails. Moreover, this property is consistent with the CC&Rs in design
and architecture.
33.1 am familiar with Lot 312. This property does not have irregular rod-iron
handrails, or irregular lights. The brownfrontdoor is not irregular. Moreover, this property is
consistent with the CC&Rs in design and architecture.
34.

I am familiar with Lot 401. This property does not have an irregular front

door, or irregular lights. This property also does not have exterior shutters. Moreover, this
property is consistent with the CC&Rs in design and architecture.
35.

I am familiar with Lot 402. This property does not have an irregular front

door, irregular lights, or an irregular mailbox. Moreover, this property is consistent with the
CC&Rs in design and architecture.
36.

I am familiar with Lot 403. This property has a green chain link fence.
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This fence was allowed to be built on this residence because the occupant of the home has
Alzheimer's disease. The fence acts to contain the owner in her backyard, and prevents her from
falling over the hill in the back of her home. The green fence therefore acts as a safety device.
This property does not have an irregular mailbox or irregular lights. Moreover, this property is
consistent with the CC&Rs in design and architecture.
37.

I am familiar with Lot 404. This property does not have irregular lights, or

an irregular mailbox. Moreover, this property is consistent with the CC&Rs in design and
architecture.
38.

I am familiar with Lot 405. This property does not have irregular lights or

an irregular front door. Moreover, this property is consistent with the CC&Rs in design and
architecture.
39.

I am familiar with Lot 406. This property does not have irregular lights

and does not have an irregular or inconsistent mailbox. Moreover, this property is consistent
with the CC&Rs in design and architecture.
40.

I am familiar with combined Lots 407 and 408. This property does not

have irregular lights or an irregular mailbox. Moreover, this property is consistent with the
CC&Rs in design and architecture.
41.

I am familiar with combined Lots 409 and 410. This property does not

have irregular handrails, irregular lights, irregular mailboxes, or irregularfrontdoors. Moreover,
this property is consistent with the CC&Rs in design and architecture.
42.

I am familiar with Lot 411. This property is consistent with the CC&Rs in

design and architecture.
43.

I am familiar with Lot 412. This property is consistent with the CC&Rs in
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•I

design and architecture.
44.

I am familiar with Lot 413. My home is located on Lot 413. The picture

as represented in Shaun Shepherd's affidavit for Lot 413 is not my home. This property is
consistent with the CC&Rs in design and architecture.
45.

I am familiar with Lot 414. Kim Geisler's home is located on Lot 414.

the picture as represented in Shaun Shepherd's affidavit is not the Geisler home. This property is
consistent with the CC&Rs in design and architecture.
46.

I am familiar with Lot 415. This property does not have an irregular front

door or irregular lights. Moreover, this property is consistent with the CC&Rs in design and
architecture.
47.

I am familiar with Lot 501. This property does not have irregular dark

trim around windows and roof lines, irregular lights, or an irregular mailbox. Moreover, this
property is consistent with the CC&Rs in design and architecture.
48.

I am familiar with Lot 502. This property does not have an irregular

window, an irregular garage door, irregular lights, or an irregular mailbox. Moreover, this
property is consistent with the CC&Rs in design and architecture.
49.

I am familiar with Lot 503. This property does not have dark trim around

windows, dark trim following the roof line and archways, an irregular iron railing, or an irregular
front door. Moreover, this property is consistent with the CC&Rs in design and architecture.
50.

I am familiar with Lot 504. This property does not have dark trim along

the roof line. Also, it does not have an irregular front door orfrontwindow. Moreover, this
property is consistent with the CC&Rs in design and architecture.
51.

I am familiar with Lot 505. This property does not have irregular lights or

an irregular front door. Moreover, this property is consistent with the CC&Rs in design and
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architecture.
52.

I am familiar with Lot 506. This property does not have irregular lights or

an irregular mailbox. Moreover, this property is consistent with the CC&Rs in design and
architecture.
53.

I am familiar with Lot 507. This property does not have irregular lights.

Moreover, this property is consistent with the CC&Rs in design and architecture.
54.

I am familiar with Lot 509. This property does not have an irregular

archway design, an irregular iron railing, or irregular lights. Moreover, this property is consistent
with the CC&Rs in design and architecture.
55.

I am familiar with Lot 510. This property does not have irregular lights

or an irregular handrails. Moreover, this property is consistent with the CC&Rs in design and
architecture.
56.

I am familiar with Lot 511. This property does not have irregular lights, or

an irregularfrontdoor. Moreover, this property is consistent with the CC&Rs in design and
architecture.
57.

I am familiar with Lot 512. This property does not have an irregular front

door. Moreover, this property is consistent with the CC&Rs in design and architecture.
I declare under criminal penalty of the State of Utah that the foregoing is true and
correct.
DATED this H

day of March, 2009.

fe^^^ ^
KEITH JONES
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